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ABSTRACT 
  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
asks courts to determine whether Congress has delegated to 
administrative agencies the authority to resolve questions about the 
meaning of statutes that those agencies implement, but the decision 
does not give courts the tools for providing a proper answer. Chevron 
directs courts to construe statutory text by applying the traditional 
theories of statutory interpretation—whether intentionalism, 
purposivism, or textualism—and to infer a delegation of agency 
interpretive authority only if they fail to find a relatively specific 
meaning. But the traditional theories, despite their differences, all 
invite courts to construe statutory text as if Congress intended that text 
to have a relatively specific meaning. The presumption of a specific 
meaning does not match the reality of how Congress designs 
regulatory statutes. Congress is more likely to eschew specificity in 
favor of agency delegation under certain circumstances—for example, 
if an issue is complex and if legislators can monitor subsequent 
agency interpretations through administrative procedures. Although 
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Chevron recognizes such “delegating” factors, it fails to sufficiently 
credit them. Even United States v. Mead Corp., which makes 
delegation the key question, falls short. This Article imagines what 
interpretive theory would look like for regulatory statutes if it actually 
incorporated realistic assumptions about legislative behavior. The 
theory would engage factors such as the complexity of the issue and 
the existence of administrative procedures as indications of 
interpretive delegation more satisfactorily than existing law does. In 
the process, it would produce a better role for courts in overseeing the 
delegation of authority to agencies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Statutes that delegate authority to administrative agencies are 
different from the rest. Congress may delegate to an agency not only 
the authority to implement the statute but, implicitly, the authority to 
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interpret it as well—that is, to specify its meaning. For other statutes, 
courts resolve any interpretive questions. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.1 recognizes this essential 
difference between regulatory statutes and other statutes. Chevron 
asks courts to approach regulatory statutes by determining whether 
Congress has delegated to the agency involved the relevant 
interpretive authority. This Article argues, however, that the decision 
fails to supply courts with the tools for providing a proper answer. 
Chevron directs courts to determine “whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” applying the 
“traditional tools of statutory construction.”2 Only when courts find 
no “clear” meaning for the statutory text do they infer a delegation of 
interpretive authority to the agency. In applying Chevron, courts rely 
heavily on the dominant theories of statutory interpretation: 
intentionalism, purposivism, or textualism. Those theories, despite 
their differences, all invite courts to construct a meaning for statutory 
text as if Congress intended the text to carry a relatively specific 
meaning. For example, intentionalism sees Congress as intending a 
meaning, albeit expressing it imperfectly in the chosen text.3 
Purposivism understands Congress as motivated by a general aim in 
enacting statutes, often imperfectly expressing that aim.4 Both permit 
courts to consult legislative history in pursuit of legislative intent or 
 
 1. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 2. See id. at 842, 843 n.9. 
 3. E.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 
24 (1988) (“[Intentionalists] would scrutinize the legislative materials to see if the legislature 
actually considered and expressed an opinion on the question under review.”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 429 (1989) (“[For intent-
based views,] the goal is not to look at a general legislative aim or purpose, but instead to see 
more particularly how the enacting legislature would have resolved the question, or how it 
intended that question to be resolved, if it had been presented.”). The exception is a more 
“objective” version of this theory. See, e.g., Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel 
B. Rodriguez, Statutory Interpretation and the Intentional(ist) Stance, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2131, 
2137–38, 2143–46 (2005) (focusing interpretation on the objective intentionality that words 
reflect). 
 4. E.g., Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative 
Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 815 
(1994) (“[P]urposivism calls on judges to identify the statute’s broader purposes and to resolve 
the interpretive question in light of those purposes.”); see also, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & 
ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION 
OF LAW 166–67, 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1958) (focusing 
interpretation on the broader purposes embodied in statutes and asking courts to assume, 
“unless the contrary unmistakably appears,” that “the legislature was made up of reasonable 
persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably”). 
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purpose. Meanwhile, textualism denies that legislative history is a 
permissible interpretive source as this theory has a strikingly different 
view of legislative behavior. Textualism tends to conform to public 
choice theory and the claim that Congress has no intent or purpose 
distinct from those explicitly stated in the statutory text.5 
Nevertheless, modern textualism invites courts to discern a meaning 
for awkward or imprecise language. It sees the statutory meaning as 
the likely product of strategic legislative compromise, which courts 
should not unsettle through resort to legislative history. Textualists 
also have a constitutional objection to the use of legislative history 
because Congress only enacted the text.6 
The search for meaning, common to the dominant theories of 
statutory interpretation, does not square with what a good deal of 
positive political theory and legal scholarship has stated about 
regulatory statutes. Congress often designs these statutes with the aim 
of delegating authority, including interpretive authority, to agencies.7 
 
 5. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994) (“Intent is empty. Peer inside the heads of legislators 
and you find a hodgepodge.” (emphasis omitted)); John F. Manning, Continuity and the 
Legislative Design, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1863, 1864 (2004) (“[M]odern formalists (qua 
textualists) doubt that intent or purpose gleaned from the legislative history offers a reliable 
way to resolve statutory indefiniteness.”); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 684–89 (1997) [hereinafter Manning, Nondelegation Doctrine] 
(describing textualist arguments against “genuine legislative intent”). See generally Daniel A. 
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 453–57 
(1988) (describing public choice insight behind textualism); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a 
“They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1992) 
(“Legislative intent is an internally inconsistent, self-contradictory expression.”). On textualism 
generally, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1989); John 
F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390, 2408–19 (2002). For a 
contrast between textualism and intentionalism, see John F. Manning, Textualism and 
Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005) [hereinafter Manning, Legislative Intent]. For a 
contrast between textualism and purposivism, see Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 
Term—Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Dialogue, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14–26 (1997); John F. 
Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006). 
 6. E.g., Eskridge, supra note 5, at 646–50 (reviewing traditional textualist arguments that 
the use of legislative history distorts the separation of powers between Congress and the 
judiciary); see also, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 66 (“[The] text prevails over intent 
because only the text went through the constitutional process.”); Farber & Frickey, supra note 
5, at 454–56 (describing Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook’s constitutional objection that 
using legislative history circumvents the constitutional lawmaking process); Manning, 
Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 5, at 711–19 (arguing that the use of legislative history cedes 
constitutional lawmaking authority from Congress as a whole to individual committees or 
members of Congress). 
 7. See, e.g., David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the 
Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 950 (1998) 
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Furthermore, Congress likely delegates authority to agencies under 
certain circumstances. For example, it likely delegates to avoid 
complex issues, which conserves legislative resources and capitalizes 
on agency expertise.8 It also likely delegates to avoid contentious 
issues and obtain consensus on legislation.9 Whatever the reason, 
Congress seeks to ensure that subsequent agency action will not 
depart too far from legislative preferences. It can do so through the 
structure of regulatory statutes, imposing procedural requirements 
that enable future legislative coalitions to monitor agency action by 
placing constituents in the administrative process.10 It can consider 
positions that the agency has steadfastly maintained in the past or 
that the agency has offered in the course of legislative drafting.11 
Congress does not always delegate expressly but often leaves 
interpretive questions for agencies to resolve.12 
Chevron recognizes such “delegating” factors; its mistake is 
failing to make those factors central to its doctrinal inquiry. The 
factors operate only as justifications for agency delegation, not as 
guides for determining the existence of that delegation. Thus, 
Chevron acknowledges that Congress may implicitly delegate 
interpretive authority to agencies and may do so to capitalize on 
agency expertise or to obtain legislative consensus.13 But rather than 
 
(“[L]egislators will delegate in those issue areas where the normal legislative process is the least 
efficient relative to regulatory policymaking by executive agencies.”). 
 8. See id. at 967. 
 9. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 38 
(1994) (asserting that legislators “create rather than avoid ambiguity” when necessary to avoid 
making choices that are unpopular with their constituents); Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. 
Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory 
Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 641 (2002) (“[It] is not unusual for competing 
factions of Congress to ‘agree to disagree’ in the drafting of a statute.”); Victoria F. Nourse & 
Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 575, 596 (2002) (interviewing legislative staffers who confirm that legislators use deliberate 
ambiguity to obtain consensus); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation in the Classroom 
and the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811–12 (1983) (identifying the failure to agree as a 
cause of statutory ambiguity). 
 10. See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative 
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 246 (1987) [hereinafter 
McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures]; Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry 
R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the 
Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 442 (1989) [hereinafter McCubbins et al., 
Structure and Process]. 
 11. See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS 131–33 (1999). 
 12. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 9, at 596–97. 
 13. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
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implementing these insights as part of the doctrinal analysis, Chevron 
reverts to the conventional theories of statutory interpretation in 
search of a meaning.14 Agency delegation is an afterthought, if a 
thought at all. The very search for a meaning directs courts away from 
what many scholars have been saying about regulatory statutes—
namely, that Congress can consider others factors.15 
Nor does United States v. Mead Corp.16 correct the problem. 
Mead recognizes that when Congress intends for an agency to issue 
interpretations with the force of law, it authorizes certain 
administrative procedures for that purpose.17 By focusing on 
procedures rather than the statutory text, Mead makes delegation 
rather than meaning the key question. Notwithstanding this 
important insight, the decision does not provide the best way to judge 
delegation. It requires that Congress authorize (and agencies utilize) 
sufficiently formal procedures but does not connect those procedures 
to their legislative function. Rather, Mead connects procedures to the 
“force of law.” Procedures can be important to Congress because they 
facilitate legislative monitoring and not necessarily because they 
promote rule-of-law values. Courts interested in delegation should 
ensure that procedures are adequate for their strategic legislative 
function. And courts should regard sufficiently formal procedures as 
affirmative indications of agency delegation. Under Mead, these 
procedures merely enable courts to apply Chevron as usual. 
This Article imagines what interpretive theory would look like 
for regulatory statutes if courts were to truly gauge the existence of 
agency delegation. In short, courts would look for evidence that 
Congress has delegated the task of specifying the meaning of a statute 
 
 14. See id. at 842, 843 n.9; see also Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a 
Voting Rule, 116 YALE. L.J. 676, 690–91 (2007) (noting that the traditional interpretive theories 
ask courts to construct a best meaning for ambiguous statutory language); Grundfest & 
Pritchard, supra note 9, at 628 (“[J]udges and scholars have developed an arsenal of interpretive 
techniques that are designed to extract functional meaning from ambiguous statutory text and 
conflicting legislative history.”); Nourse & Schacter, supra note 9, at 617 (“[T]o the extent that 
intentionalism assumes a legislative intent always exists or that textualism assumes a deliberate 
and precise legislative word choice, these theories may rely on questionable empirical 
assumptions across the run of cases.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 15. See, e.g., Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 7, at 950 (arguing that legislators delegate 
when the legislative process produces less efficient outcomes than the administrative process); 
Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 640–42 (describing legislative incentives to delegate 
authority); Nourse & Schacter, supra note 9, at 596–97 (quoting legislative staffers discussing the 
political-consensus-building purposes of delegation). 
 16. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 17. Id. at 231–33. 
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to the agency charged with implementing it. Rather than focusing 
heavily or exclusively on the relative clarity of statutory language, 
courts would examine the sorts of considerations that positive 
political theorists and legal scholars have identified as indications of 
legislative intent to delegate interpretive issues to agencies. Assuming 
Congress likely delegates for reasons related to the complexity or 
contentiousness of the issue addressed by a statute, courts should 
consider the complexity or contentiousness of the issue by examining 
the statute or the surrounding context. Congress also likely delegates 
under conditions that minimize principle-agent concerns. It can use 
administrative procedures to monitor agency interpretations. Or it 
can rely on a position that the agency has long maintained in the past 
or offered in the course of legislative drafting. Courts should look for 
signs of these factors as well, either in the statute or the surrounding 
context. The stronger the case for interpretive delegation, the more 
courts should hesitate to read the statutory text as “clear” on the 
theory that Congress intended such clarity. Ordinarily, courts search 
for a meaning to avoid undermining statutory purposes or unsettling 
legislative deals. Under delegating assumptions, courts would show 
genuine respect for Congress by not allowing the relative clarity of 
the language to defeat what is most plausibly understood as an 
interpretive delegation. 
In this Article, I use two Supreme Court opinions to illustrate the 
framework that I envision. In Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. 
Department of Education,18 Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, 
consciously set aside Chevron’s question of statutory meaning and 
examined the political factors relevant to interpretive delegation.19 He 
upheld the agency interpretation on the basis of these political 
factors, drawing criticism from virtually every other Justice for his 
unorthodox analysis, even those who agreed with his ultimate 
disposition of the case.20 In Gonzales v. Oregon,21 Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the majority, found that the issue was not the sort that 
Congress was likely to have delegated to the agency involved.22 He 
made this determination based on realistic assumptions about 
 
 18. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007). 
 19. Id. at 1541. 
 20. See, e.g., id. at 1551 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (worrying because the “opinion of the 
Court . . . inverts Chevron’s logical progression”). 
 21. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006). 
 22. Id. at 925. 
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legislative behavior, including the lack of reasons for and conditions 
of interpretive delegation.23 Neither Justice explained precisely why 
these unconventional analyses were appropriate. But both implicitly 
recognized the need to depart from the norm. 
I argue that this departure is justified because it conforms to 
congressional will and for the other well-known reasons that Chevron 
captures: agencies generally should elaborate regulatory policy 
because they are more expert and politically accountable than 
courts.24 At the same time, this approach does not call for abject 
judicial deference or judicial abdication. For example, courts would 
not allow agencies to assert interpretive authority when Congress has 
not authorized proper procedures. In so doing, courts would serve as 
“faithful agents” by enabling Congress to control when not to 
delegate. By the same token, they would reinforce rule-of-law values 
because procedural formality tends to ensure that agency action is 
rational and fair. In addition to preserving delegation, courts would 
still police its exercise. Thus, courts would ensure that agencies 
remain within the scope of their delegated authority and issue 
reasonable interpretations.25 
I acknowledge that widespread adoption of a “delegation-
respecting” approach has downsides. Even if the Supreme Court is 
capable of applying it with a reasonable degree of accuracy, lower 
courts might face considerable difficulties. Mead has already 
introduced confusion on the issue of legislative intent to delegate, and 
that case is restricted to a single procedural consideration.26 A 
delegation-respecting approach, which essentially articulates and 
develops Mead’s basic insight, might make matters worse. Although 
these concerns have merit, I believe that courts and commentators 
should not condemn the approach based solely on lower courts’ 
experience with Mead. The Court has made applying that decision 
 
 23. See id. at 917–22 (considering the relevant expertise of the agency, the moral nature of 
the question, and the procedures for issuing the interpretation). 
 24. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
 25. Administrative law has long provided a basis for such review, for example, in the 
requirement of reasoned decisionmaking. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983) (elaborating the requirement of reasoned 
decisionmaking). 
 26. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 
58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1446–81 (2005) (providing an empirical study of lower court cases); 
Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347 passim 
(2003) (showing confusion in D.C. Circuit cases trying to apply Mead). 
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more complicated than it needs to be, and my theory offers significant 
clarifications. If courts and commentators reject all other suggestions 
from this Article, they should accept the suggestion to embrace and 
reform Mead. Mead moves in the right direction by making agency 
delegation rather than statutory meaning the threshold question. 
Even restricted to a gatekeeper function, precluding delegations 
rather than validating them, Mead advances legislative supremacy 
and rule-of-law values. Refocusing on the legislative use of 
procedures would provide courts with more guidance and impose 
fewer institutional costs. 
In the end, I acknowledge that no theory based on legislative 
intent to delegate will yield a simple rule. Ultimately, simplicity is not 
the sole benchmark for evaluating any interpretive theory. An 
acceptable theory should reflect a reasonable balance among the 
various goals of statutory interpretation.27 If courts and commentators 
nevertheless reject a delegation-respecting theory on institutional 
grounds, as Justice Scalia advocated in Mead,28 they should also reject 
the search for meaning on other grounds. The overarching lesson 
from this Article is that the search for meaning gives courts too much 
power to frustrate interpretive delegations when Congress is likely to 
intend them and when they are likely to promote other normative 
values. Even if sufficiently simple from an institutional standpoint, 
existing law cannot supply the relevant “rule” for normative reasons. 
In its place, courts and commentators should be prepared to adopt a 
presumption of judicial deference to agency interpretations—one 
stronger than Chevron’s presumption ever has been. 
Finally, I discuss the implications for the use of statutory 
interpretation to constrain broad delegations. Ever since the demise 
of the constitutional nondelegation doctrine, courts have relied on 
statutory interpretation as a surrogate for addressing concerns about 
broad delegations.29 Agencies can use broad delegations to produce 
 
 27. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2044 
(2006) (book review) (arguing against an institutionally simple interpretive proposal that 
generates normative costs). 
 28. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 29. The nondelegation doctrine reflects constitutional limits on Congress’s ability to 
delegate regulatory authority to agencies. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the 
Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1403–06 
(2000) [hereinafter Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium] (encapsulating the history of 
the nondelegation doctrine). With the exception of two 1935 decisions, the Court has never 
applied the doctrine to ban a statutory delegation. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
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undemocratic policies, impair states’ rights, raise constitutional 
questions, and impose harsh criminal penalties. On one view, 
Chevron and Mead are not wrong and are framed to allow courts to 
address these concerns. My argument suggests this view can no longer 
be premised on congressional will, as it sometimes is. Congress is 
likely to intend the very delegations that courts (and commentators) 
aim to restrict. Still, a delegation-respecting theory does not preclude 
courts from using statutory interpretation to address delegation 
worries if they justify that practice on other grounds. There is a better 
way. Analytically, it makes more sense to address nondelegation 
worries through administrative law rather than statutory 
interpretation. Specifically, I argue that courts should remand agency 
interpretations rather than narrowing regulatory statutes. This role 
allows courts to express their views without overstepping their 
bounds. In addition, it affords agencies an opportunity to craft better 
policy by applying their specialized expertise and consulting with the 
political branches. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I demonstrates that the 
conventional theories of statutory interpretation share a basic search 
for meaning, which administrative law doctrine does not sufficiently 
alter. Yet the search for meaning is inappropriate because it does not 
match how Congress designs regulatory statutes. Part II sketches an 
interpretive theory that better matches legislative realities, departing 
in significant respect from existing doctrine. Part III offers two 
Supreme Court opinions as examples of how the theory might work 
in actual practice. Part IV considers institutional and normative 
objections to the theory and offers some responses. 
 
States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935) (invalidating a statute under nondelegation doctrine); Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (same). It has merely insisted that Congress 
supply an “intelligible principle” in the statute guiding the agency’s exercise of delegated 
authority. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (articulating 
the intelligible principle requirement for the first time). Finding this requirement easily satisfied, 
the Court has relied on statutory interpretation to vindicate its abiding worries about broad 
delegations. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in 
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 515–52 (2008) (describing constitutional law 
and administrative law as efforts to combat worries about arbitrary administrative 
decisionmaking that stem from broad delegations). More specifically, it has used various 
interpretive norms to narrowly construed broad statutory delegations. See Bressman, Schechter 
Poultry at the Millennium, supra, at 1408–15 (describing the use of interpretive norms to 
constrain broad delegations); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2110–15 (1990) (discussing the emergence of clear statement principles as 
a surrogate for the nondelegation doctrine). 
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I.  THE DOMINANT THEORIES AND THEIR  
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DOCTRINE 
Although the dominant theories of statutory interpretation differ 
in many ways, they share an important feature: they invite courts to 
construe statutory text as if Congress intended that text to have a 
relatively specific meaning. That presumption does not reflect how 
Congress designs regulatory statutes, as administrative law doctrine 
recognizes. In this Part, I show that existing doctrine, in particular 
Chevron and Mead, nonetheless allows this presumption to dominate 
and therefore allows courts to deprive agencies of interpretive 
authority more often than Congress intends. To demonstrate the full 
extent of the problem, I set forth the core aspects of regulatory 
statutes that positive political theorists and legal scholars have 
identified. 
A. The Search for Statutory Meaning 
The conventional theories of statutory interpretation take 
varying approaches to awkward or imprecise text in part because they 
hold different pictures about legislative behavior. Intentionalists and 
purposivists see legislative inadvertence or, more specifically, the 
inevitable difficulty of capturing all the aspects or applications of a 
policy in a relatively few words.30 According to these theorists, 
Congress has a meaning or a purpose in mind but sometimes chooses 
words that poorly or incompletely express it. Intentionalists seek to 
recover the meaning when interpreting words, using legislative 
history when relevant, and purposivists look for indications of 
broader statutory purposes.31 Modern proponents of these theories 
 
 30. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 3, at 23 (“Intentionalism . . . claims that textualism 
inappropriately ignores contextual elements in statutory interpretation. Contextual analysis is 
necessary as a matter of semantics (words have no ‘plain meaning’; meaning depends on context 
and usage).”); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 416 (“The central problem is that the meaning of words 
(whether ‘plain’ or not) depends on both culture and context. Statutory terms are not self-
defining, and words have no meaning before or without interpretation.”); see also John F. 
Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2009, 
2013–16 (2006) (describing the interpretive approaches of many thinkers, including Justice 
Stevens and Judge Posner, as reflecting this view of the legislative process). 
 31. See, e.g., Redish & Chung, supra note 4, at 816 (“[Purposivists] would also have their 
judges explore the entire legal landscape to determine how the statute at hand can best be made 
to fit within its greater legal context.”); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 430 (arguing that 
intentionalism can provide useful “context and purpose”); see also STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE 
LIBERTY 85 (1994) (describing purposivism as an approach under which “judges should pay 
primary attention to a statute’s purpose”); Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 
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look for more objective evidence on the assumption that actual 
legislative intent may be hard to reconstruct given the complexities of 
the legislative process; but they assume that every enacted law has a 
reasonable purpose or an “intentionalist stance.”32 
By contrast, modern textualists trace awkward or imprecise text 
to legislative compromise.33 They view the legislative process as 
chaotic and messy. In this environment, legislators cut deals to obtain 
consensus, and awkward words reflect those deals.34 Modern 
textualists adhere to the ordinary meaning of those words to give 
effect to whatever deal they may manifest.35 Textualists also maintain 
a rule-of-law or constitutional defense against the use of legislative 
history because only the text is enacted.36 
On the basis of their respective visions, proponents of each 
theory ask courts to announce the statutory meaning that best reflects 
what Congress was after—for example, a broad statutory purpose or 
a specific legislative deal. By construing language in this fashion, 
those proponents all can claim to position courts as faithful agents of 
Congress. Undoubtedly, the different camps believe that their theory 
will produce a statutory meaning that most often reflects the 
legislative design. 
The basic law governing interpretation of regulatory statutes 
reflects a different picture of legislative behavior. Chevron establishes 
a two-step test for courts to apply when reviewing agency 
interpretations of regulatory statutes. The Chevron test tells courts 
first to determine whether “Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue,” applying the “traditional tools of statutory 
 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1916 (2006) (“Purposivists, or intentionalists, look at . . . legislative 
history and other background social understandings[]in an effort to figure out what Congress 
was up to.”). 
 32. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 1124 (“Every statute must be conclusively 
presumed to be a purposive act.”). 
 33. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 34. See Manning, Legislative Intent, supra note 5, at 441 (“[Textualists] believe that 
smoothing over the rough edges in a statute threatens to upset whatever complicated bargaining 
led to its being cast in the terms that it was.”). 
 35. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 36. See Manning, Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 5, at 695–705 (arguing that the 
legislative history bypasses the Article I requirements of bicameralism and presentment); John 
F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 71–74 (2001) 
(arguing that Article I requirements of bicameralism and presentment compel textualism). 
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construction.37 But when courts find no meaning for the statutory text, 
Chevron instructs them to defer to the agency interpretation as long 
as that interpretation is reasonable.38 Chevron recognizes that 
Congress may intend for agencies rather than courts to fill gaps in 
regulatory statutes.39 It notes that Congress may have a variety of 
reasons for delegating interpretive authority to agencies—for 
example, to capitalize on agency expertise or to obtain legislative 
consensus.40 Regardless of the particular reason, Chevron directs 
courts to accept the legislative assignment of interpretive authority 
and defer to reasonable agency interpretations.41 Doing so is 
consistent not only with congressional delegation but also with 
administrative expertise and political accountability. Agencies possess 
more expertise than courts for handling regulatory schemes that are 
“technical and complex” and for reconciling the “competing 
interests” that regulatory decisions often involve.42 Agencies are also 
accountable to the people, not directly but through the president, and 
“it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of Government to 
make such policy choices.”43 
Mead recognizes that whether Congress intends an agency to 
issue an interpretation with the force of law depends on whether 
Congress has authorized and the agency has used certain procedures 
for that purpose. Mead involved an interpretation that the United 
States Customs Service had issued through a ruling letter addressed 
to a party seeking guidance on a tariff classification.44 These letters 
come from forty-six different offices of the agency at a rate of 10,000 
to 15,000 per year without an opportunity for public participation and 
are generally unaccompanied by a reasoned explanation.45 The Court 
held that Congress would not intend to delegate interpretive 
authority to an agency through such a procedure.46 In this way, Mead 
suggests that Congress would not intend to delegate interpretive 
 
 37. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 843 n.9 
(1984). 
 38. Id. at 843–44. 
 39. Id. at 865. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233 (2001). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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authority to an agency absent the authorization (and use) of 
sufficiently formal procedures, such as notice-and-comment 
rulemaking or formal adjudication. Procedural formality ensures 
“fairness and deliberation” and “bespeak[s] the legislative type of 
activity that would naturally bind more than the parties to the 
ruling.”47 
Although Chevron and Mead offer a view of legislative behavior 
that is appropriately different from the standard view, neither directs 
courts to adopt a sufficiently different (or better) method of statutory 
interpretation. Chevron mentions the reasons for interpretive 
delegation as a justification for judicial deference. But it actually 
directs courts to approach awkward or imprecise statutory language 
by asking the same question as the standard theories of statutory 
interpretation: whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue.”48 And it tells courts to answer that question 
applying the “traditional tools of statutory construction.”49 Thus, 
courts effectively approach interpretive questions mindful of giving 
effect to broad statutory purposes or finely tuned legislative deals. 
Only when that effort reveals no clear meaning do courts infer a 
delegation of interpretive authority.50 In other words, courts treat a 
lack of clarity as the exclusive proxy for interpretive delegation. 
Perhaps, then, it is no wonder that a wide range of legal scholars have 
characterized the congressional delegation rationale for Chevron as a 
fiction.51 Because Congress probably does not draft statutes with 
Chevron in mind, courts can justify judicial deference, if at all, using 
the other values that Chevron cites—agency expertise and political 
accountability.52 
 
 47. Id. at 230, 232. 
 48. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 49. Id. at 843 n.9. 
 50. Id. at 842. 
 51. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2027, 2132 (2002) (“[E]ven adherents to [Chevron] theory . . . acknowledge that the 
evidence of such enacting congressional intent is ‘weak’ and even ‘fictional’ . . . .”); Gersen & 
Vermeule, supra note 14, at 689 (noting that Justices and commentators have recognized that 
the presumption of legislative intent underlying Chevron is a “fiction” and agreeing with this 
view); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 871–72 
(2001) (noting that the presumption of legislative intent underlying Chevron deference “has 
been described by even [Chevron’s] strongest defender [Justice Scalia] as ‘fictional’”). 
 52. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. Many have expressed other views about Chevron, 
including the view that it is premised on congressional allocation of interpretive authority 
between agencies and courts. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 51, at 837; Kevin M. Stack, The 
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Mead adds a procedural dimension to the analysis,53 making 
legislative intent to delegate the threshold inquiry of statutory 
interpretation. But the Mead opinion does not carry the procedural 
consideration through to its proper conclusion. Mead deprives 
agencies of interpretive authority when procedures are deficient 
because the procedures lack the law-like features that Mead 
emphasizes. Mead has essentially no effect, however, when the statute 
authorizes and the agency uses relatively formal procedures—as when 
an agency interpretation is the product of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. Even if the agency passes the Mead analysis, courts 
proceed to apply Chevron as usual, effectively regarding words as 
poor expressions or concrete deals unless that approach fails to 
produce a clear meaning. Because Mead gives way to Chevron in 
routine cases, it does not go far enough to alter the standard search 
for statutory meaning. 
The result is that, Chevron and Mead notwithstanding, courts 
approach regulatory statutes with much the same mindset as they 
approach other statutes. It follows that they are just as likely to find a 
specific meaning in a case involving an agency as in a case that does 
not. This is not an empirical claim, although it well might be true. 
Rather, it is an analytical claim about the framework that courts 
apply. Because courts approach awkward or imprecise text in 
regulatory statutes mindful of respecting broad statutory purposes or 
particular legislative deals, they are unlikely to grant agencies their 
delegated interpretive authority as often as Congress intends. 
Chevron cannot overcome the problem by simply instructing 
courts to set aside their meaning in favor of an agency’s “reasonable” 
 
Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 587 (2005); cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue 
Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 
472–74 (2002) (arguing that Congress once used a legislative convention to confer on agencies 
the authority to act with the force of law and that, when this convention fell out of use, courts 
adopted a deferential approach to determining whether Congress authorized an agency to act 
with the force of law). Although the literature conceptualizing Chevron is too vast to cite, other 
excellent examples include Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and 
Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187 (1992); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy 
of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225 (1997); Mark Seidenfeld, A 
Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency 
Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994); Sunstein, supra note 29. 
 53. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 218 (2001) (holding that congressional 
intent to delegate the authority to make rules with the force of law “may be shown in a variety 
of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment 
rulemaking”). 
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meaning. The thought is a good one, but it is easier said than done. 
Once courts work actively to construct a meaning for statutory text, 
as they do under all the dominant theories of statutory interpretation, 
they will have considerable difficulty recognizing the reasonableness 
of other interpretations. As Professor Thomas Merrill has observed 
about textualism: 
Textualism . . . seems to transform statutory interpretation into a 
kind of exercise in judicial ingenuity. The textualist judge treats 
questions of interpretation like a puzzle to which it is assumed there 
is one right answer. The task is to assemble the various pieces of 
linguistic data, dictionary definitions, and canons into the best (most 
coherent, most explanatory) account of the meaning of the 
statute . . . . 
  This active, creative approach to interpretation is subtly 
incompatible with an attitude of deference toward other 
institutions—whether the other institution is Congress or an 
administrative agency. In effect, the textualist interpreter does not 
find the meaning of the statute so much as construct the meaning. 
Such a person will very likely experience some difficulty in deferring 
to the meanings that other institutions have developed.54 
Professor Merrill sees less risk of judicial ingenuity in 
intentionalism because the judge remains more cognizant of 
legislative intent and has more tools available for finding such intent.55 
In my view, intentionalism and purposivism are still vulnerable to 
judicial craft because they also ask courts to construct a meaning for 
statutory text on the assumption that the text has one right answer. 
This way of thinking makes it difficult to see other possible meanings 
and, moreover, to accept the assignment of interpretive authority to 
the agency. Professors Jacob Gersen and Adrian Vermeule have gone 
even further to suggest that judges cannot set aside their meaning for 
the agency’s meaning.56 Once a court has found that the text is 
susceptible to a best reading, Professors Gersen and Vermeule 
question what it means as a conceptual matter for the text to have 
 
 54. Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 351, 372 (1994). 
 55. See id. 
 56. See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 697–98. 
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other “reasonable” readings.57 How can an incorrect interpretation 
nevertheless be reasonable? They also question whether courts 
psychologically can abandon the view to which they have become 
committed.58 The authors quote Justice Breyer, who wrote, 
It is difficult, after having examined a legal question in depth with 
the object of deciding it correctly, to believe both that the agency’s 
interpretation is legally wrong, and that its interpretation is 
reasonable. More often one concludes that there is a “better” view 
of the statute for example, and that the “better” view is “correct,” 
and the alternative view is “erroneous.”59 
Somewhat counterintuitive, the search for meaning is 
problematic whether a court finds a meaning that precludes an agency 
interpretation or permits it. Most worrisome is when a court finds a 
meaning that precludes an agency interpretation because, under such 
circumstances, the court is able to substitute its idea of wise policy for 
that of the agency. As Chevron recognizes, courts should restrain 
themselves in this regard because the agency is the congressional 
delegate as well as the more technically sophisticated and politically 
responsive policymaker.60 Yet the search for meaning is also 
worrisome when a court finds a meaning that is consistent with an 
agency interpretation. It is worrisome because an agency, though 
victorious in the short term, may lack authority to alter its 
interpretation as circumstances change. Chevron anticipates that 
agency interpretations may evolve over time, whether as a result of 
emerging technologies or new administrations.61 But the Court has 
clarified in a subsequent decision that such interpretive room only 
exists when the statutory text is ambiguous, not when a court has 
 
 57. See id. at 693–97 (discussing the conceptual problems that arise when attempting to 
discern the limits of “reasonable” interpretation). 
 58. See id. at 697–98 (making use of Justice Scalia’s opinion in MCI Telecommunications 
Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994), to illustrate the tendency of courts to commit to one 
“right” interpretation when other reasonable interpretations are available). 
 59. Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 697 (quoting Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of 
Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 379 (1986)). 
 60. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) 
(“In these cases the Administrator’s interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of 
manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme is technical 
and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the 
decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 61. See id. at 863–64 (“[T]he agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider 
varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”). 
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previously determined that it is clear.62 When a court finds that the 
statutory text has a specific meaning, it forecloses future changes, 
even if flexibility is part of why Congress created the agency in the 
first instance. 
To summarize, the conventional theories of statutory 
interpretation invite courts to answer a question about statutory 
meaning, and neither Chevron nor Mead sufficiently displaces that 
inquiry. As a result, courts are likely to find a specific meaning for 
statutory text more often than Congress intends. The remaining 
Sections explain more fully why the search for meaning is 
inappropriate for regulatory statutes. It does not match what many 
positive political theorists and legal scholars have been saying about 
how Congress designs regulatory statutes. 
B. The Possibility of Agency Delegation 
Political scientists have sought to explain why Congress delegates 
authority to agencies.63 Although many strands of such work might be 
useful in illustrating the set of factors that motivate Congress, I rely 
here on positive political theory (PPT) because it offers hypotheses 
about legislative behavior that are comparable to those on which the 
dominant theories of statutory interpretation have tended to rely. 
PPT thus provides a helpful platform from which to evaluate those 
theories. 
Positive political theorists start from the premise that Congress is 
composed of members who, as rational actors, primarily seek to 
improve their reelection chances.64 They may have other goals—“such 
as the desire for power, rewarding friends, and good government”—
but they cannot achieve any of these goals unless they hold office.65 
To improve their reelection prospects, members of Congress seek 
policies that track their preferences or, more specifically, the 
 
 62. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 
(2005) (holding that an agency interpretation may overrule a prior judicial interpretation only if 
the underlying statutory language is ambiguous). 
 63. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, ECONOMICS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, ECONOMICS 
OF LAW vi–xvii (2007) (summarizing the literature). 
 64. See, e.g., Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 7, at 961 (“We assume the preferences of 
legislators and the President to be, first and foremost, reelection.”). 
 65. Id. 
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preferences of their constituents.66 One way to ensure that policy 
tracks legislative preferences is for Congress to specify that policy—
that is, to write “detailed, exacting laws.”67 But this approach is not 
always best. In certain circumstances, Congress may determine that 
delegation to agencies is actually the better way to serve its interests. 
Consider first and foremost that Congress has limits on its time 
and expertise.68 Every resource devoted to specifying policy is a 
resource unavailable for other “electorally productive activities,” 
including campaign activities.69 When Congress enlists the aid of 
agencies to set regulatory policy, it might do so because it lacks the 
requisite time and expertise to formulate the details of such policy. As 
Professors David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran explain, the reasons 
are twofold: 
The first and most obvious reason is that the executive branch is 
filled (or can be filled) with policy experts who can run tests and 
experiments, gather data, and otherwise determine the wisest course 
of policy, much more so than can 535 members of Congress and 
their staff. The second, less obvious reason has to do with the fact 
that expertise garnered in legislative committees cannot be 
transformed directly into policy outcomes. Rather, it must first pass 
through the floor, which may decide to make some alterations to the 
committee’s proposals. The existence of the floor as a policy middle-
man gives committees less incentive to gather information in the 
first place. Executive agencies, on the other hand, are not hampered 
by the need to obtain congressional approval; their rulings become 
law directly.70 
 
 66. Id. (“We assume that political actors who seek reelection will, on any given policy, 
attempt to bring final outcomes as close as possible to the median voter in their politically 
relevant constituency.”). 
 67. Id. at 962; see also David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures, 
Information, and Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 697, 699 (1994) (noting that a direct 
method of circumscribing agency influence is “explicitly limiting the discretion of an agency to 
move outcomes from the status quo”); Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side 
of the Story, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 213, 228 (1990) (“The most direct way is for 
today’s authorities to specify, in excruciating detail, precisely what the agency is to do and how 
it is to do it, leaving as little as possible to the discretionary judgment of bureaucrats . . . .”). 
 68. See Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 67, at 701; David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A 
Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 106–12 (2000); B. Dan Wood & 
John Bohte, Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of Administrative Design, 66 J. POL. 176, 
176 (2004). 
 69. Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 7, at 962. 
 70. Id. at 967 (footnote omitted). 
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Thus, Congress cannot gain expertise as efficiently as agencies, and it 
cannot transform its expertise into policy solutions as easily as 
agencies. The costs of writing specific legislation are high, indeed 
wastefully so. Congress therefore is likely to delegate more authority 
to agencies “[t]he more complex [the] policy area” is.71 
Consider next that Congress balances a variety of other interests 
in deciding how much authority to delegate to agencies. For example, 
Congress might attempt to avoid blame for controversial policy 
choices by shifting them to agencies, while still claiming credit for 
broad solutions to public problems.72 In other words, Congress might 
aim to write just enough policy to receive a positive response for its 
actions, while deflecting any negative attention for the burdensome 
details to the agency. Legislators also might consider whether to 
allocate interpretive authority to courts or agencies by assessing the 
relative risk that each institution will depart from legislative 
preferences. For example, a legislator who holds views consistent with 
the preferences of the median legislator might prefer judicial 
interpretation, whereas a legislator who holds views different from 
the median legislator might prefer agency interpretation. The 
hypothesis is that courts are more likely to issue decisions that track 
the preferences of the median legislator, and agencies may diverge in 
other directions.73 Legislators may base this choice on a particular 
distinction. Judicial decisions are more predictable over time but 
more variable across issues than agency decisions.74 Congress’s 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS 
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 9–12, 49–57 (1993); see also JAMES Q. WILSON, 
BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 235–256 (1989) 
(exploring how Congress exerts control over regulatory agencies through delegation and the 
legislative process); Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of 
Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 55–63 (1982) (dissecting and comparing several 
hypotheses that try to explain why Congress delegates power to agencies); Morris P. Fiorina, 
Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. 
CHOICE 33, 46–52 (1982) (examining claims that Congress delegates power to regulatory 
agencies to shift both decisionmaking and political costs to the agency). 
 73. See Morris P. Fiorina, Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of 
Legislative Power, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33, 44–55 (1986) (arguing that model legislators choose 
between two lotteries: one involving courts, whose decisions are expected to reflect the 
preferences of the median legislator, and one involving agencies, whose decisions are expected 
to be biased away from the intent of that legislator). 
 74. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, 
Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1038, 1047–49 
(2006). 
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allocation of interpretive authority in a particular instance depends 
on whether the median legislator prefers policy stability (courts) or 
coherence (agencies).75 
Another dimension is also relevant: political alignment between 
the legislative branch and the executive branch.76 Professors Epstein 
and O’Halloran have argued, for example, that Congress is likely to 
delegate more authority to executive branch agencies when the 
president is of the same political party, that is, during periods of 
unified government.77 In such periods, Congress may reasonably 
assume that presidential preferences are less likely to diverge from 
legislative preferences.78 By the same token, Congress is likely to 
delegate to independent agencies, which are run by officials who are 
protected by statute from plenary presidential removal, if it desires 
delegation but the president is from the opposite political party.79 
These observations connect to a broader point: whatever the 
motivation for delegating to agencies, positive political theorists agree 
that Congress remains aware that agencies may choose policies that 
depart from legislative preferences.80 Put simply, delegation creates a 
principal-agent problem.81 Agencies are influenced from a number of 
directions—“by the President, by interest groups, by the courts, and 
by the bureaucrats themselves”—and those pressures may push 
regulatory policies away from legislative preferences.82 Congress 
 
 75. See id. at 1049–58. 
 76. See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 11, at 131–33. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 7, at 966. 
 79. See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 11, at 154–55. 
 80. See generally Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on “Administrative 
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”: Administrative Process and Organizational 
Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REV. 499, 501–04 (1989) (describing 
bureaucratic drift, which is the difference between policy passed in legislation and policy 
implemented by an agency, and coalitional drift, during which legislative and executive 
preferences change over time); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and 
Time Consistency: A Comment on Macey, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 111, 113–16 (1992) (same). 
 81. See JOHN D. HUBER & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION? THE 
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 26 (2002) (“The principal-
agent framework from economics has played an extremely prominent and powerful role in [the] 
institutional approach to relations between politicians and bureaucrats.”). 
 82. See Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT 
GOVERN? 267, 271 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) (“Experts have their own 
interests—in career, in autonomy—that may conflict with those of [legislators].”); Epstein & 
O’Halloran, supra note 7, at 963. 
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therefore seeks to monitor agency action, but it must devise 
mechanisms for acquiring information about that action. 
Professors Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz have 
identified two sorts of monitoring mechanisms: “police patrols” and 
“fire alarms.”83 Police patrols are committee hearings and other direct 
forms of oversight.84 Fire alarms are indirect forms of oversight; they 
enlist private parties to gather information about agency action.85 
Professors McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast (McNollgast) 
have argued that Congress can use the procedures in the 
Administrative Procedure Act as fire alarms.86 More specifically, 
Congress can use administrative procedures to place constituents into 
the administrative process, where they may acquire the information 
necessary to evaluate agency action.87 If displeased with that action, 
they may alert members of Congress to intervene before the agency 
has altered the status quo.88 McNollgast also contend that Congress 
can use procedures to “stack the deck” in favor of the same 
constituents that supported a regulatory statute by affording those 
constituents access to agency decisions before they are final.89 
Administrative procedures are particularly efficient and effective 
monitoring mechanisms, shifting the monitoring costs from Congress 
to its constituents.90 
For Congress, ex post oversight mechanisms, including 
administrative procedures, form a “precondition” of delegation91 and 
also “make the benefits of statutory control less compelling.”92 Thus, 
ex post oversight mechanisms and statutory control (through specific 
 
 83. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984). 
 84. Id. at 166. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 173–74. 
 87. See McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 10, at 248; McCubbins et 
al., Structure and Process, supra note 10, at 442; see also Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., Pablo T. 
Spiller & Santiago Urbiztondo, An Informational Perspective on Administrative Procedures, 15 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 238, 301 (1999) (modeling the functions of administrative procedures). 
 88. See McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, supra note 10, at 442. 
 89. Id. at 442, 444 (italics omitted). 
 90. See McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 10, at 254 (“[B]ecause 
policy is controlled by participants in administrative processes, political officials can use 
procedures to control policy without bearing costs themselves . . . .”). 
 91. Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 67, at 716 (emphasis omitted). 
 92. Kathleen Bawn, Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, 
Oversight, and the Committee System, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101, 101 (1997). 
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wording) can act as “substitutes” for one another.93 The presence of 
one can suggest less need for the other. 
All of these observations furnish assumptions about the 
considerations that matter to Congress in allocating regulatory 
authority. None is without criticisms. The important point is that 
positive political theorists are in basic agreement that Congress is 
strategic in how it designs regulatory statutes, and that such strategic 
behavior is relevant in examining regulatory statutes. 
C. The Possibility of Deliberate Ambiguity 
Another phenomenon is also relevant. Both PPT scholars and 
legal scholars have observed that a divided Congress may choose 
deliberately ambiguous words to obtain consensus, thereby delegating 
interpretive authority to agencies or courts.94 Thus, Congress can use 
awkward words to achieve legislative compromise, as textualists 
assert. But the compromises are more like dodges than deals.95 
Congress chooses words that are imprecise enough for legislators with 
opposing views each to claim victory. Meanwhile, the language also 
allows those legislators to press for their favored positions at the later 
administrative or judicial level.96 The ultimate losers may avoid blame 
by laying it at the feet of the responsible agency or court. By choosing 
words that “mean all things to all people,”97 Congress can obtain the 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 38 (noting that the simple “plain meaning” rule of 
textualism overlooks that “the goals of at least some of the authors are to create rather than 
avoid ambiguity”); Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 641 (“[I]t is not unusual for 
competing factions of Congress to ‘agree to disagree’ in the drafting of a statute.”); Mathew D. 
McCubbins, The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 721, 742–43 
(1985) (asserting that legislators delegate when necessary to obtain consensus on policy); 
Nourse & Schacter, supra note 9, at 596 (interviewing legislative staffers who confirm the use of 
deliberate ambiguity to obtain consensus); Posner, supra note 9, at 806–07 (identifying failure to 
agree as a cause of statutory ambiguity). 
 95. See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 641 (“Each constituency can hope that its 
position will ultimately prevail, and ambiguity thereby expands the circle of winners in 
legislative battles, at least temporarily.”); Robert A. Katzmann, The American Legislative 
Process as a Signal, 9 J. PUB. POL’Y 287, 290 (1989) (“A problem may be defined in general 
terms . . . because it is easier to secure support for ambiguously worded statutes that mean all 
things to all people.”). 
 96. See Katzmann, supra note 95, at 290–91 (“Once a problem is identified or recognized, 
interests within and without Congress push for an interpretation consistent with their policy 
preferences, regardless of whether it is faithful to the original legislative intent.”). 
 97. Id. at 290. 
BRESSMAN IN FINAL2.DOC 12/8/2008  2:25:12 PM 
572 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:549 
requisite support to enact a bill while preserving opportunities to 
recommence the battle at another time and in another place. 
Professors Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter have identified the 
phenomenon of deliberate ambiguity empirically by interviewing 
legislative staffers.98 According to Professors Nourse and Schacter, the 
staffers recognized that a decision to create ambiguity left future 
resolution to courts and agencies.99 Nevertheless, the staffers stated 
that unless legislators can get a bill passed, they can do nothing at 
all.100 But for some, the delegation was as intentional as the ambiguity. 
Staffers “realized that statutory ambiguity created an opportunity to 
let an agency, as opposed to a court, resolve the issue, and sometimes 
they specifically desired this result as well.”101 
Professors Joseph Grundfest and Adam Pritchard have identified 
an example of this phenomenon in the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).102 I set out this example in some detail 
because I refer to it later.103 The PSLRA arose under circumstances 
suggesting that Congress could not have enacted the statute without 
agreeing to disagree about the applicable pleading standard for 
liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.104 
Before the PSLRA, the Supreme Court had held that mere 
negligence did not satisfy the scienter requirement.105 Lower courts 
that addressed the issue diverged on whether a “barely reckless” or 
“highly reckless” standard applied.106 Furthermore, the lower courts 
divided on the actual pleading requirements: whether plaintiffs must 
“allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent,” 
as the Second Circuit determined,107 or could get away with merely 
 
 98. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 9, at 596 (interviewing sixteen staffers working on 
the Senate Judiciary Committee or one of its subcommittees, who reported that legislative 
drafting involves “willful lack of clarity”). 
 99. Id. at 596–97. 
 100. Id. at 596 (“This is . . . a political process. Sometimes one cannot allow the perfect to be 
the enemy of the good.” (quoting a staffer discussing deliberate ambiguity)). 
 101. Id. at 596–97. 
 102. See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 650, 650–66 (describing the “legislative 
evolution” of the pleading standard used in the PSLRA). 
 103. See infra Part II.C. 
 104. Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 650. 
 105. Id. at 652. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. (quoting Shields v. Citytrust BanCorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
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“saying that scienter existed,” as the Ninth Circuit found.108 The 
PSLRA “purported to resolve this conflict by adopting a uniform 
standard for pleading scienter, the ‘strong inference’ standard.”109 But 
the pleading issue actually implicated the underlying scienter issue: 
whether recklessness suffices, and if so, what recklessness means. 
Initially, the House bill required actual knowledge, precluding 
recklessness altogether, but the version that passed contained a 
“strong inference” pleading standard for recklessness.110 The Senate 
bill also contained the strong inference standard, and the relevant 
committee report explains this choice as following that of the Second 
Circuit.111 But the issue was not that simple. The Second Circuit had 
not specified exactly what the strong inference standard required. 
Senator Arlen Specter introduced an amendment that included more 
precise considerations based on Second Circuit case law.112 The 
Senate adopted the amendment, but the conference committee 
deleted it.113 The conference committee report contains conflicting 
signals on whether the committee preferred a weaker or stronger 
standard.114 
Meanwhile, the PSLRA itself “goes to lengths to sidestep the 
issue by using ‘required state of mind’ in the pleading provision, 
rather than knowledge or recklessness.”115 As Professors Grundfest 
and Pritchard explain, 
This formulation has the air of a compromise, suggesting that 
neither proponents nor opponents of recklessness were capable of 
garnering a majority (much less a supermajority) for their view. By 
 
 108. Id. (quoting In re Glenfeld, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th Cir. 1994) (en 
banc)). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. at 652–53 (“The bill eventually passed by the House . . . codified recklessness as 
‘[d]eliberately refraining from taking steps to discover whether one’s statements are false or 
misleading.’” (quoting Securities Litigation Reform Act, H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. § 10A(a)(4) (as 
passed by the House, Mar. 8, 1995))). 
 111. See id. at 653 (explaining that the Senate banking committee report clearly stated an 
intent to adopt the Second Circuit standard). 
 112. See id. at 654 (asserting that Senator Specter’s proposed amendment would have made 
the law rely more explicitly on the Second Circuit tests). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. at 655–57 (explaining that the language of the statement of managers section 
conflicts with a reasonable interpretation of the concededly vague language of footnote 23 in 
that same section). 
 115. Id. at 658 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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leaving the question unanswered in the statute, both sides could 
hope that the Supreme Court would eventually rule in their favor.116 
According to Professors Grundfest and Pritchard, this agreement 
to disagree was essential to the passage of the legislation. As further 
evidence, the authors note that the Senate barely mustered enough 
votes to override a presidential veto—President Clinton’s first, and 
one based expressly on the pleading standard.117 In his veto message, 
President Clinton stated that he opposed a pleading standard higher 
than that of the Second Circuit and highlighted language in the 
conference committee report that might support such a position.118 
Preserving the deliberate ambiguity on this issue was critical for 
members of Congress: “The loss of even two votes in the Senate due 
to disagreement over the ‘strong inference’ standard would have 
doomed the legislation.”119 Thus, in the floor debate concerning an 
override vote, the Senate managers of the PSLRA who shared the 
president’s view of the pleading standard nevertheless distanced 
themselves from the president’s remarks as well as the related 
conference committee report statements to gain the requisite support 
for the legislation.120 
Professors Grundfest and Pritchard join others in contending 
that the possibility of deliberate ambiguity creates complications for 
the dominant theories of statutory interpretation.121 Those theories, 
despite their differences, have a central commonality. They seek 
clarity when none may exist or at least where Congress may intend 
that none exists. Professors Nourse and Schacter contend that the 
dominant theories are therefore either implausible or disingenuous: 
“[T]he fictions deployed in judicial opinions are a kind of diversion, 
allowing judges to exercise significant discretion in determining 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. at 659. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 660. 
 121. See, e.g., id. at 667–77 (explaining that the final construction of the PSLRA prompted 
the appellate courts to interpret the strong inference standard using three different approaches); 
Nourse & Schacter, supra note 9, at 616–21 (describing potential flaws in judicial assumptions 
about legislative intent that belie the leading theories of statutory interpretation); Sunstein, 
supra note 3, at 411 (“[D]ebates about statutory interpretation, in and out of the judiciary, often 
dissolve into fruitless and unilluminating disputes about the constraints supplied by language 
‘itself’ (as if such a thing could be imagined).”). 
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statutory meaning while attributing their discretionary choices to 
Congress.”122 
In sum, positive political theorists and legal scholars posit that 
Congress may delegate to agencies the task of giving statutory 
provisions more precise meaning for certain reasons and under 
certain conditions. Although they differ on the details, they agree that 
these reasons and conditions are important to thinking about the 
legislative design of regulatory statutes. Chevron and Mead are in 
general agreement, but they do not adequately integrate these 
reasons and conditions into statutory interpretation. For the most 
part, they leave in place the conventional theories and those theories’ 
shared search for statutory meaning. Under these circumstances, it is 
questionable whether courts can accurately or reliably determine 
whether Congress has delegated interpretive authority to agencies. 
II.  A DELEGATION-RESPECTING THEORY 
This Part imagines what interpretive theory would look like if it 
were based on the considerations that are thought to induce Congress 
to delegate interpretive authority to agencies. A delegation-
respecting theory would require courts to consider indications of 
interpretive delegation like the ones that PPT and legal scholarship 
have identified. To be clear, I do not claim that either PPT or legal 
scholarship provides a means for translating their general hypotheses 
or empirical observations about legislative behavior into an 
interpretive theory. Rather, I argue that PPT and legal scholarship 
identify the right sort of signals for courts to track when interpreting 
regulatory statutes. Courts tracking these signals would be less likely 
to read statutory language as clear on the assumption that Congress 
intended that result. 
This Part also addresses how courts, applying a delegation-
respecting theory, would handle related issues. If courts generally 
disregard statutory language, how would they ensure that agencies 
remain within the scope of their delegated interpretive authority? If 
courts are generally interested in respecting interpretive delegations, 
would they continue to review the reasonableness of agency 
interpretations? In the absence of sufficient evidence that Congress 
 
 122. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 9, at 619. Grundfest and Pritchard do not challenge 
judicial practice but note that it thrusts legislators into a game with courts over whose 
interpretive strategy ultimately will prevail. See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 670–72. 
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delegated interpretive authority to an agency, how would courts 
resolve interpretive questions? This Part saves evaluation of the 
theory for the final Part. 
A. Reasons for Interpretive Delegation 
Congress is likely to delegate authority to agencies for 
predictable reasons—primarily to avoid resolving complex and 
contentious issues that, if resolved, would defeat the enactment of 
legislation or would generate other costs to legislators.123 Under a 
theory directed at this behavior, courts would identify one or both of 
these reasons as evidence of an interpretive delegation by Congress to 
the relevant agency. I do not suggest that courts engage in legislative 
mind reading, trying to recover actual legislative reasons for 
interpretive delegation. Rather, courts should recognize that 
Congress is likely to delegate certain issues based on their nature. 
Moreover, courts should recognize that this delegating impulse does 
not vary whether the grant of authority to the agency is explicit or 
implicit. A complex or contentious issue should motivate delegation 
to an agency whether Congress responds by enacting an express 
mandate or choosing an unspecific term. There is one difference. 
Without an express mandate, courts must determine whether an issue 
is sufficiently complex or contentious to prompt an interpretive 
delegation. To do so, they would examine the text, purpose, and 
background of the statute. 
Chevron is not contrary to this general focus on the nature of the 
issue. It observes that Congress may delegate interpretive authority to 
an agency “thinking that those with great expertise and charged with 
responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better 
position to do so.”124 Chevron also acknowledges that Congress may 
delegate interpretive authority to obtain legislative consensus.125 But 
Chevron does not ask courts to examine whether an issue is complex 
or contentious as part of their interpretive delegation analysis, which 
is the suggestion here. 
If courts are to evaluate the nature of the issue, practical 
questions abound. First, what constitutes a complex issue? From a 
legislative standpoint, a complex issue is a technical issue, requiring 
 
 123. See supra Parts I.B–C. 
 124. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
 125. Id. 
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both time and expertise. If the statutory provision later to be 
interpreted concerns a technical matter, requiring the acquisition or 
assessment of specialized information, it is likely the sort of subject 
that generalist staffers or legislators are unwilling or unable to handle, 
even with the benefit of outside consultants.126 A provision that 
depends on science, economics, or statistics falls into this category. If 
a provision requires applying specialized skill, it is also likely the kind 
that Congress may delegate to agencies.127 Thus, Congress may 
possess information but still encounter difficulty translating that 
information into appropriate rules—for example, rules governing 
acceptable risk of illness or injury, an acceptable level of drug 
effectiveness, or an acceptable degree of market concentration. 
A complex issue may also be a subset of a more general issue. 
Chevron included as a reason for interpretive delegation that perhaps 
Congress “simply did not consider the question at this level.”128 
Congress can opt for generality to conserve time.129 By delegating the 
details, Congress may claim credit for broad statutory responses while 
avoiding blame for inevitable regulatory burdens.130 Courts need not 
focus on the precise legislative gains from generality. Rather, they 
might simply attempt to find such generality in the text or structure of 
the statute. 
Under this approach, when would a court conclude that a 
regulatory issue is not so complex as to suggest delegation? 
Truthfully, the answer is infrequently. Congress will predictably enlist 
agency judgment not only to arrive at wise solutions to public 
problems but to avoid the obligation to choose those solutions itself. 
Moreover, if Congress has delegated authority to an agency because 
of the complexity of a regulatory regime, it likely did not intend to 
withhold authority from the agency over interpretive questions. 
Those questions are likely to share the same general character as the 
 
 126. Cf. W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, 
Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 
76 (1989) (noting that the benefit of agency regulation (compared to tort litigation) increases 
“with the degree of specialization and complexity of data and with the greater general need for 
the information in the economy”). 
 127. Cf. id. at 105 (arguing that “courts lack the scientific expertise to develop the necessary 
doctrines and causation rules relevant to multiple and probabilistic causation” in toxic tort 
cases). 
 128. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 129. See supra text accompanying notes 68–71. 
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 72–73. 
BRESSMAN IN FINAL2.DOC 12/8/2008  2:25:12 PM 
578 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:549 
regulatory regime to which they are relevant. Thus, courts might 
expect more often than not to start their interpretive analysis with a 
thumb on the scale for interpretive delegation. Under the existing 
framework, courts do not start from here. The search for meaning 
more likely predisposes them away from interpretive delegation. In 
this sense, the approach that I advocate is potentially more 
deferential than Chevron. 
One might still imagine that some issues are the sort that 
Congress did not intend to commit to an agency either because the 
agency lacked the requisite expertise or because Congress is capable 
of resolving the issue itself. For example, Congress can make moral or 
value judgments, such as whether to impose a criminal sanction for a 
regulatory violation.131 Even though the regulatory regime is complex, 
the sanctions question within it does not involve specialized 
knowledge or skill. In this sort of case, complexity, standing alone, 
does not indicate an interpretative delegation. 
Another common reason for supposing Congress has delegated 
interpretive authority to an agency is the need to short-circuit 
extended legislative battles over contentious issues. As Chevron 
contemplates, it will sometimes be the case that Congress “was unable 
to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each 
side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the 
agency.”132 A contentious issue is one subject to active debate 
 
 131. Kristin E. Hickman, Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG, 26 VA. TAX REV. 905, 923 (2007) 
(“As designated representatives of the people, members of Congress are both more in touch 
with communal perceptions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ and more accountable to the public for the 
moral judgments they make than agencies are. While the Supreme Court has not explicitly 
made this link, other courts and scholars have highlighted the moral element of criminalization 
as a further reason for not extending judicial deference to Justice Department interpretations of 
the criminal code.”); see also BREYER, supra note 31, at 107 (arguing that Congress is capable of 
making value judgments and so courts should not defer to agencies’ judgments instead). 
Another possible example is private rights of action. The Court has held that courts, not 
agencies, must determine whether to imply such rights of action. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 
494 U.S. 638, 649–50 (1990) (finding that Congress expressly delegated authority to courts to 
determine whether statutes confer private rights of action). Yet, even here, Congress can be 
deliberately ambiguous on the issue. See Marc I. Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action 
Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 33, 40 (1979). Furthermore, Professor Matthew 
Stephenson has argued that determining whether to imply a private right of action involves the 
sort of complex judgment that Congress might seek to avoid. See Matthew C. Stephenson, 
Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative 
Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 127–28 (2005). Thus, private rights of action may or may not be 
complex. Cf. id. at 148–70 (arguing that Chevron should automatically apply to agency 
determinations on this issue). 
 132. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
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between legislative coalitions, the resolution of which in the statute 
for either side might derail the law’s passage. Unlike complex issues, 
contentious issues are not evident from the text or structure of the 
statute. Courts must look to the surrounding circumstances, as 
Professors Grundfest and Pritchard did in examining the PSLRA. As 
summarized in Part I, they performed an extensive reconstruction of 
the legislative history and political backdrop of the statute, finding an 
agreement to disagree on particular issues and consequent delegation 
of interpretive authority on those issues.133 
In their example, the interpretive delegation flowed to the courts 
not the SEC,134 which illustrates an important point about this factor. 
Courts must uncover evidence not only of an agreement to disagree 
but also of a consequent delegation to the agency. Congress likely 
intended courts to interpret the PSLRA or at least knew that they 
would. The explanation is straightforward: courts have been the 
primary interpreters of securities law in the context of private class 
actions.135 With respect to other statutes, a court might discover an 
indication, either in the legislative history or a background norm, that 
Congress intended or expected the agency to exercise interpretive 
authority. 
A court might discover no indication that Congress had any 
preference other than to avoid resolving the contentious issue. Under 
such circumstances, the contentiousness of the issue alone would not 
support a finding of interpretive authority to the agency. Whether the 
agency can assert interpretive authority would depend on other 
factors. Note, however, that even if courts can claim interpretive 
authority, they might exercise that authority differently, as I explain 
in Section C.3. 
The bottom line is that courts would focus on legislative reasons 
for interpretive delegation by examining the nature of the issue. 
 
 133. See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 650–66; see also supra Part I.C. (explaining 
the academic hypothesis that the opposing factions on the “strong inference” issue agreed to 
ambiguous language, each hoping the Supreme Court would rule in its favor). 
 134. Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 667–77. 
 135. See Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 381 (2007) 
(“There is little dispute about the centrality of private actions in enforcing the complex web of 
securities law.”); Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A 
Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 206–08 (1990) (noting that the SEC’s 
approach to insider trading relies on enforcement actions brought by the SEC and managed by 
lower courts). But see James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Security Regulation, 57 DUKE 
L.J. 625, 630 (2007) (noting that the SEC has issued rules in certain areas). 
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Courts would view Congress as having delegated interpretive 
authority to an agency when confronted with a complex or 
contentious issue. When courts identified issues as such, they would 
be building an affirmative case for interpretive delegation. The 
stronger the affirmative case, the less courts should regard the text as 
a legislative attempt at a clear meaning that bars the interpretive 
delegation. 
B. Conditions of Interpretive Delegation 
A focus on legislative reasons is only half the case. When 
Congress delegates for any reason, it has an ongoing interest in 
ensuring that subsequent agency action tracks legislative 
preferences.136 Competing legislative coalitions wish to influence 
subsequent agency interpretations in their preferred directions.137 Yet 
Congress cannot influence what it cannot see. Thus, Congress is more 
likely to delegate under certain conditions—those that facilitate 
legislative monitoring of agency interpretations. If courts are going to 
build an affirmative case for delegation, they must also focus on these 
monitoring conditions. 
Administrative procedures are a mechanism that facilitates 
legislative monitoring.138 Mead aligns with this view, making 
procedures relevant on the question of legislative intent. This is an 
important move in the direction of recognizing appropriate 
assumptions about legislative behavior in the regulatory context.139 
Based on that premise, it is no stretch to suggest that courts ought to 
recognize procedures as a legislative condition of interpretive 
delegation. But Mead botches the implementation. First, it fails to 
connect procedures with legislative monitoring. Instead, it links 
procedures to rule-of-law values, stating that proper procedures 
“foster fairness and deliberation” and “bespeak the legislative type of 
activity that would naturally bind more than the parties to the 
ruling.”140 Meanwhile, Barnhart v. Walton,141 which the Court decided 
just one term later, highlights other factors, including “the interstitial 
nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the 
 
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 80–82. 
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 111–15. 
 138. See supra text accompanying notes 83–90. 
 139. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001). 
 140. Id. at 230, 232. 
 141. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
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importance of the question to administration of the statute, the 
complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the 
Agency has given the question over a long period of time.”142 These 
cases produce competing frameworks for atypical procedures, which 
has confused lower courts and produced conflicting results. 
Moreover, neither approach adequately produces a result that 
reflects what Congress needs for monitoring purposes. For example, a 
court might reject an interpretation rendered through an informal 
adjudication because the informal adjudication lacked the “fairness 
and deliberation” in the sense that Mead means.143 Yet that particular 
procedure may have been sufficient for legislative monitoring 
purposes because it provided constituents with access to information 
about the agency interpretation ahead of time. A court might approve 
an interpretation announced in a brief prepared for court litigation 
because the brief reflected the expertise and “careful consideration” 
that Barnhart contemplates.144 At the same time, the brief may have 
evaded legislative monitoring because it was not available to 
constituents in advance of litigation. When focusing on administrative 
procedures, courts should consider their strategic use to Congress in 
overseeing agency interpretations. In so doing, they would better 
track the conditions under which Congress delegates interpretive 
authority to agencies. 
Second, Mead fails to recognize that sufficiently formal 
procedures, if a necessary condition of delegation to an agency, 
should count in favor of an interpretive delegation to the agency, not 
just against it. Mead deprives agencies of interpretive authority unless 
they possess and use sufficiently formal procedures. Thus, it can have 
a negative effect on agency interpretive authority. But once an agency 
passes Mead muster, courts apply Chevron as usual. In other words, 
they search for a meaning behind particular language, as if Congress 
intended such a meaning. Courts could infer more of an affirmative 
signal from adequate procedures, understanding these procedures as 
part of the case for interpretive delegation to the agency. In this way, 
procedures would help to displace the search for meaning rather than 
facilitate it.145 
 
 142. Id. at 222. 
 143. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230. 
 144. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222. 
 145. An agency cannot bootstrap itself into a delegation by using relatively formal 
procedures when Congress has not authorized those procedures. If the linchpin is legislative 
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Congress can seek other means for ensuring that agency action 
roughly tracks legislative preferences.146 It can have a proxy, such as 
the party of the president. Or, to go further, Congress can have more 
concrete opportunities to assess agency interpretations. For example, 
an agency may be involved in drafting the legislation, sharing its 
interpretations with legislative staff. If those understandings are 
sufficiently specific, Congress may rely on them when enacting 
legislation. In addition, an agency may maintain a long-standing 
policy or practice that Congress can observe when enacting 
legislation. Unlike procedures, agency involvement or long-standing 
practice is not evident on the face of the statute. Rather, courts must 
determine these aspects from the surrounding circumstances. 
Agency involvement or long-standing practice can function in 
lieu of procedures from a legislative standpoint, providing sufficient 
assurance that agency interpretations will roughly track legislative 
preferences. This is one way to understand Barnhart. In Barnhart, the 
Court upheld an interpretive delegation not because the procedures 
met with the criteria that Mead identifies for “force of law” purposes 
but for a host of seemingly unrelated factors. Viewed through a 
legislative lens, most of the factors sound like reasons for delegation, 
including “the interstitial nature of the legal question,” “the 
importance of the question to the administration of the statute,” and 
“the complexity of that administration.”147 The final factor—the 
“careful consideration that the Agency has given the question over a 
long period of time” suggests that the agency policy was well worked 
out and unlikely to change.148 Congress could observe it and 
reasonably rely on it. Thus, the Court upheld an interpretive 
delegation because Congress had a reason for the delegation and an 
assurance that the agency interpretation would mirror its long-
standing practice. On this account, Barnhart does not offer an 
alternative test for measuring the adequacy of procedures, as lower 
courts have concluded. Rather, it offers an example in which 
Congress could evaluate the agency interpretation for consistency 
with legislative preferences through other means. 
 
intent to delegate, then Congress must intend to provide the agency with interpretive authority. 
The agency’s decision to afford Congress practical monitoring opportunities via procedures, 
even if beneficial on this ground or others, cannot cure the delegation deficiency. 
 146. See supra text accompanying notes 83–90. 
 147. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222. 
 148. Id. 
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Congress can include procedures notwithstanding a prior agency 
interpretation, and it is likely to do so. Procedures are useful for 
making policy decisions in general. In addition, authorizing 
procedures may suggest that Congress anticipated the possibility of 
change and provided for legislative monitoring in the event of change. 
Under such circumstances, Congress intended a delegation but not 
exclusively in reliance on the prior agency interpretation. Procedures, 
more so than the prior agency interpretation, furnish the requisite 
assurance that agency interpretations will track legislative 
preferences. 
To summarize, Congress is more likely to delegate when it can 
ensure that subsequent agency interpretations will roughly track 
legislative preferences. It can use procedures for that purpose or rely 
on positions that the agency has maintained before or taken during 
the course of legislative drafting. On the account I defend, courts 
would treat the presence of these factors as indications that Congress 
intended an interpretive delegation. 
C. Application Issues 
The purpose of focusing courts on political indicia of interpretive 
delegation would be to prevent them from reading statutory language 
as clear or otherwise depriving an agency of interpretive authority 
based on inappropriate assumptions about legislative behavior. This 
Section addresses several residual issues that courts would have to 
confront if they adopted this framework: (1) ensuring that agencies 
remain within the scope of their delegated interpretive authority, 
(2) reviewing the reasonableness of agency interpretations, and 
(3) resolving interpretive questions in the absence of sufficient 
indications of interpretive delegation to an agency. 
1. Scope of Agency Interpretive Authority.  Even if courts found 
sufficient indications of interpretive delegation to an agency, they 
may also encounter instances in which an agency has exceeded the 
scope of its authority. Courts would still police this boundary, as they 
always have done.149 An agency cannot interpret a statute to reach a 
subject that it does not address or to include a policy that it rules 
 
 149. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
33 (1983) (“[T]he judicial duty is to ensure that the administrative agency stays within the zone 
of discretion committed to it by its organic act.”). 
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out.150 A simple illustration: an agency cannot interpret the word 
“clothing” to cover “automobiles,” no matter how broad the 
interpretive delegation of that term.151 Congress must be able to rely 
on the communicative aspect of words at some very general level, to 
limit the reach of a statute and preclude certain considerations. In a 
sense, the constitutional nondelegation doctrine so requires.152 Under 
the nondelegation doctrine, every regulatory statute must contain an 
“intelligible principle” constraining and guiding agency action.153 That 
intelligible principle can be quite minimal or vague, and it usually is.154 
Nevertheless, the statute cannot confer a blank check on the 
agency.155 Congress must employ some language that can be 
understood to delineate the boundaries of administrative authority. 
But courts must be restrained in making scope-of-authority 
determinations. When courts consult statutory language to ensure 
that the agency has remained within the scope of its power, they must 
avoid reintroducing the problematic search for meaning. Thus, courts 
should not ask what “clothing” means in a relatively specific sense, 
either as written or in light of broad statutory purposes. Rather, they 
should seek to determine whether “clothing” as conventionally 
defined or understood can include “automobile” without depriving 
the statute of a communicative limit. This approach is appropriate 
because Congress need not precisely define “clothing” to exclude 
“automobile.” 
As a practical matter, courts should rarely find that an agency 
has exceeded the scope of its authority. The point about “clothing” 
and “automobiles” is that agencies may not choose readings that are 
 
 150. See Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 67, at 701 (discussing statutes that, without 
dictating a single best policy, “did eliminate certain policies from consideration”). 
 151. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1543 (2007) (“A customs 
statute that imposes a tariff on ‘clothing’ does not impose a tariff on automobiles, no matter 
how strong the policy arguments for treating the two kinds of goods alike.”). 
 152. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (understanding 
the nondelegation doctrine as entailing a statutory limit on delegations of authority to agencies). 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (acknowledging that 
although Congress, when delegating decisionmaking, must establish intelligible principles for 
agencies to follow, those principles only must provide minimal guidance); Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 415–16 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same). 
 155. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542, 541–42 (1935) 
(invalidating a statutory delegation that conferred “virtually unfettered” discretion on an 
agency); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (invalidating a statutory 
delegation for lacking standards). 
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so illogical as to constitute virtual category mistakes or polar 
opposites. Thus, a statute directing an agency to regulate x does not 
authorize an agency to regulate y.156 But the legislative act of 
precluding an agency from selecting y does not obligate an agency to 
regulate x in any particular manner. Indeed, that act says very little 
about x. When an agency regulates x in an unreasonable manner, a 
court should not conclude that the agency has exceeded the scope of 
its authority. Courts should instead address such errors through a 
different, more forgiving channel, as Section C.2 shows. 
2. Reasonableness of Agency Interpretations.  Asking courts to 
use different proxies for determining whether Congress has delegated 
interpretive authority would not diminish courts’ responsibility to 
evaluate the reasonableness of an agency interpretation. Courts have 
always reviewed agency interpretations for reasonableness whether 
under Chevron157 or the arbitrary and capricious test from the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).158 Although the relationship 
between the Chevron inquiry and the arbitrary and capricious test has 
confused courts, the effect of each is much the same.159 Agency 
interpretations, like all agency policy decisions, must comport with 
the reasoned decisionmaking requirement.160 
 
 156. Relatedly, when Congress instructs an agency to regulate x, it cannot decline to 
regulate one type of x. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1460 (2007) (finding that 
carbon dioxide is an “air pollutant” within the meaning of the Clean Air Act and therefore that 
the statute “forecloses” the EPA’s contrary reading). 
 157. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) 
(explaining that agency interpretations are valid unless “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute”). 
 158. See 5 U.S.C § 706 (2006) (“The reviewing court shall . . . set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law . . . .”). 
 159. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Step Two of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 85, 96–102 (John F. 
Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005) (noting confusion among courts concerning the relationship 
between Chevron Step Two and APA arbitrary and capricious analysis and arguing that the two 
should mirror one another); Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 
YALE L.J. 952, 1005–07 (2007) (demonstrating that Chevron Step Two incorporates the 
reasoned decisionmaking requirement). 
 160. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41, 43 
(1983) (“[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation 
for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” 
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))). 
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The reasoned decisionmaking requirement has a long lineage in 
administrative law, predating the APA.161 It rests on certain 
assumptions about the administrative process—that absent judicial 
supervision, agencies would be insufficiently attentive to certain 
considerations, whether statutory factors, policy aspects, alternative 
solutions, or party comments.162 Courts have sought to address these 
pathologies by asking agencies to issue along with their decisions an 
explanation for those decisions.163 The reasoned decisionmaking 
requirement serves important normative values. For example, the 
requirement ensures that agency decisionmaking comports with rule-
of-law values, like rationality and consistency.164 In addition, it ensures 
that the administrative process is transparent and accessible, 
enhancing political accountability and public participation.165 
It is possible to challenge the validity of these assumptions or the 
pursuit of these goals. I believe that preserving reasonableness review 
becomes even more important once courts adopt a different approach 
to statutory interpretation. Administrative law becomes the main 
vehicle for disciplining agency interpretations that depart from 
accepted norms, such as rationality and accountability. I discuss in 
Part IV the role of administrative law in responding to additional 
concerns about agency interpretations. 
3. Exercise of Judicial Interpretive Authority.  If a court fails to 
find an interpretive delegation to the agency involved, the court 
possesses the relevant interpretive authority. This is not surprising: if 
an agency has no interpretive authority, then it follows that the court 
must. But the issue is actually more complicated. How courts should 
exercise interpretive authority depends on why they possess such 
authority. Existing law tracks this insight in some places and not in 
others. 
 
 161. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1749, 1777–78 (2007) (tracing the pre-APA roots of the reasoned decisionmaking 
requirement). 
 162. Id. at 1778–79 (describing the function of the reasoned decisionmaking requirement); 
see also State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41 (listing considerations agencies might neglect). 
 163. See, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42 (requiring the agency to explain the basis for its 
decision); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415, 419–20 (1971) 
(same). 
 164. See Bressman, supra note 161, at 1778–79. 
 165. See id. at 1779. 
BRESSMAN IN FINAL2.DOC 12/8/2008  2:25:12 PM 
2009] CHEVRON’S MISTAKE 587 
Assume a court finds that an agency lacks interpretive authority 
because Congress had no reason to delegate. The issue is not 
technical. The agency involved possesses no relevant expertise for 
resolving it. No evidence suggests that the issue generated any 
controversy that might have obstructed the law’s passage. The 
reasonable inference under these circumstances is that Congress did 
not intend to delegate the issue at all—for resolution by any other 
actor, agency, or court. Congress either misstated its intent or struck a 
deal. As a result, courts should interpret any awkwardness or 
imprecision in the statutory text as matching their customary 
assumptions about legislative behavior. If ever there is a place for 
Chevron as usual, this is it. 
Assume a court finds instead that Congress agreed to disagree 
but designated the courts as the relevant interpreter—as in the 
PSLRA context. Courts have special experience interpreting 
securities laws in class action suits. When courts are recipients of 
delegated interpretive authority, should they exercise their authority 
by applying the conventional theories of statutory interpretation? 
Because Congress had in mind no specific meaning for the relevant 
statutory language, courts are justified in relying less on the 
traditional tools of statutory construction, particularly textual 
analysis. For guidance, they might consult other sources, such as the 
agency’s practical experience with the regulatory regime. This 
approach mirrors the one from Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,166 which 
directs courts to consult the agency’s views of wise policy if they are 
“persuasive.”167 
What if Congress failed to authorize procedures that facilitate 
legislative monitoring? This deficit suggests that Congress did not 
intend to delegate interpretive authority to the agency. Otherwise, it 
would have sought a means for ensuring that the agency did not 
depart from legislative preferences. Assuming no agency involvement 
or longstanding practice, Congress likely intended the statutory 
language to be clear, or it meant to delegate interpretive authority to 
courts. In either case, courts fill any gaps. Existing law does not 
attempt to isolate the difference, but the difference is worth knowing 
if possible. Again, if the statute delegates interpretive authority to 
courts, they could rely less on traditional tools of statutory 
 
 166. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 167. Id. at 140. 
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construction and more on the agency’s practical experience with the 
regulatory regime. 
Finally, Congress might have provided sufficiently formal 
procedures, but the agency failed to employ them. Because the 
agency failed to abide by an essential condition of its delegation, 
courts are the default interpreters. The idea is not that Congress 
would prefer a judicial interpretation. It is that agencies must 
internalize the costs of foregoing proper procedures. Agencies must 
face a penalty for fencing Congress out of the process. They run the 
risk of losing their preferred interpretations, especially as those 
interpretations are more adventurous than courts would be willing to 
accept based on their standard approaches.168 The result is that 
agencies choose procedures for interpretations that make significant 
moves from the status quo. 
But when Congress provided procedures that the agency failed 
to follow, courts are not the permanent interpreters. They possess 
authority not because Congress preferred judicial resolution but 
because the agency involved failed to abide by a condition of its 
delegation. All else equal, Congress preferred administrative 
resolution. Consequently, an agency may reverse the judicial 
interpretation if it uses sufficiently formal procedures in the future. 
Duly authorized agency interpretations take priority over judicial 
interpretations, much as statutes do. This result tracks the reasoning 
in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Services.169 
*          *          * 
Courts must consider the reasons for and conditions of 
interpretive delegation to agencies if they are interested in 
recognizing the existence of such delegation. Courts identifying these 
factors would be less likely to find clear meaning when Congress 
likely intended none to exist. The existing framework views Congress 
as pursuing particular legislative deals or broad statutory purposes—
 
 168. See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, 
Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 528, 531 (2006) (arguing that agencies, to secure approval for their interpretations from 
courts, choose textually plausible interpretations when they want to avoid the costs of issuing 
more aggressive interpretations through formal procedures that also satisfy courts). 
 169. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983–84 
(2005). 
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and, in both cases, commits courts to search for a meaning behind 
statutory language. 
Under this new approach, courts would still retain their essential 
functions. They would ensure that agencies stay within the scope of 
their delegated authority and issue reasonable interpretations. Courts 
would also possess interpretive authority when an agency lacks it. 
Existing administrative law doctrine provides the basic guidance for 
these inquiries. It is not far off in this context. But even here, the 
judicial posture would be different. 
III.  ILLUSTRATIONS 
So far this discussion has been fairly abstract, suggesting 
particular factors for courts to examine in interpreting regulatory 
statutes and showing how these factors differ from the existing 
framework. This Part offers two examples in which members of the 
Court actually may be understood as applying approaches remarkably 
like the interpretive theory that this Article envisions. The examples 
help to flesh out the theory. 
The first example is Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. 
Department of Education. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, 
examined the considerations that matter to Congress when delegating 
authority to agencies and regarded the statutory text as having a less 
significant role. His colleagues, including those that agreed with his 
conclusion, took issue with his approach on the very question that this 
Article raises: which interpretive theory best positions courts to 
respect congressional will in the regulatory context? 
The second example is Gonzales v. Oregon. The majority 
opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, is best explained in terms of the 
delegation considerations that this Article presents. The decision is 
instructive at another level. It shows that the Court, employing better 
assumptions about legislative behavior, does not always find an 
interpretive delegation to the agency involved. Meanwhile, the 
dissenting opinion demonstrates the pitfalls of textualism, even when 
used to uphold an agency interpretation. 
A. Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Education 
Zuni involved what looked like a difficult but not atypical issue 
of statutory interpretation. The Federal Impact Aid Act contains a 
method for the secretary of education to use when determining 
whether a state’s public school funding program “equalizes 
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expenditures” among that state’s public school districts.170 Only if a 
state’s program equalizes expenditures may the state use federal aid 
to reduce its own local funding.171 According to the statute, a state’s 
program equalizes expenditures when the disparity in per-pupil 
expenditures does not exceed 25 percent.172 But, when doing so, the 
secretary is to “disregard” school districts “with per-pupil 
expenditures . . . above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile 
of such expenditures . . . in the State.”173 The secretary issued a series 
of regulations, in place for thirty years, interpreting the so-called 
“‘disregard’ instruction”174 essentially to allow the secretary to 
consider “the number of the district’s pupils as well as . . . the size of 
the district’s expenditures per pupil.”175 For New Mexico’s local 
district aid program, which applied to the petitioner, the secretary 
calculated expenditures, consistent with its regulations, as follows for 
fiscal year 2000: 
Department officials listed each of New Mexico’s 89 local school 
districts in order of per-pupil spending . . . . After ranking the 
districts, Department officials excluded 17 school districts at the top 
of the list because those districts contained (cumulatively) less than 
5 percent of the student population; for the same reason, they 
excluded an additional 6 school districts at the bottom of the list. 
  The remaining 66 districts accounted for approximately 90 
percent of the State’s student population. Of those, the highest 
ranked district spent $3,259 per student; the lowest ranked district 
spent $2,848 per student. The difference, $411, was less than 25 
percent of the lowest per-pupil figure, namely $2,848. Hence, the 
officials found that New Mexico’s local aid program qualifies as a 
program that “equalizes expenditures.”176 
Zuni Public School District sought review of the agency’s 
findings, conceding that the calculations were correct under the 
regulations but arguing that the regulations were inconsistent with the 
 
 170. See 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b) (2006). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. § 7709(b)(2)(A). 
 173. Id. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i). 
 174. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1538−39 (2007). 
 175. Id. at 1538. 
 176. Id. at 1540 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(1) (2000)). 
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statute.177 Zuni contended that the statute required the secretary to 
calculate the upper and lower percentile cutoffs “solely on the basis 
of the number of school districts (ranked by their per-pupil 
expenditures), without any consideration of the number of pupils in 
those districts.”178 Under Zuni’s method, “only 10 districts (accounting 
for less than 2 percent of all students) would have been identified as 
the outliers” and “[t]he difference, as a result, between the highest 
and lowest per-pupil expenditures of the remaining districts (26.9 
percent) would exceed 25 percent.”179 The statute thus would “forbid 
New Mexico to take account of federal impact aid as it decides how to 
equalize school funding across the State.”180 
After the Tenth Circuit affirmed the secretary’s decision by a 
split vote of a twelve-member en banc panel, the Court took the case 
to consider the interpretive question.181 Justice Breyer wrote the 
opinion for the majority, which Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, 
and Alito joined with several separate concurrences.182 Justice Breyer 
began the customary way, citing Chevron and noting that “Zuni’s 
strongest argument rests upon the literal language of the statute.”183 
But rather than considering that argument at the outset, as Chevron 
instructs, Justice Breyer made an unusual move. He wrote, “For 
purposes of exposition, we depart from a normal order of discussion, 
namely an order that first considers Zuni’s statutory language 
argument. Instead, because of the technical nature of the language in 
question, we shall first examine the provision’s background and basic 
purposes.”184 He found that “[c]onsiderations other than language 
provide us with unusually strong indications that Congress intended 
to leave the Secretary free to use the calculation method before us 
and that the Secretary’s chosen method is a reasonable one.”185 
The first consideration was the complexity of the issue. Justice 
Breyer stated that “the matter at issue—i.e., the calculation method 
for determining whether a state aid program ‘equalizes 
expenditures’—is the kind of highly technical, specialized interstitial 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 1537. 
 183. Id. at 1540. 
 184. Id. at 1541 (citation omitted). 
 185. Id. 
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matter that Congress often does not decide itself, but delegates to 
specialized agencies to decide.”186 The second consideration was the 
“history” of the statute, suggesting that Congress has ample 
opportunity to monitor the agency interpretation, which predated the 
statute.187 The secretary had promulgated the regulation at issue in 
1976 under a 1974 version of the federal aid statute.188 Meanwhile, in 
the ensuing twenty years until Congress enacted the version of the 
statute at issue in the case, “no Member of Congress has ever 
criticized the method the 1976 regulation sets forth nor suggested at 
any time that it be revised or reconsidered.”189 In addition, the 
secretary himself had sent the relevant statutory language to 
Congress in 1994, and Congress “adopted that language without 
comment or clarification.”190 
The third consideration was the reasonableness of the secretary’s 
interpretation in light of the purpose of the statutory disregard 
instruction.191 Justice Breyer relied on the secretary’s explanation for 
how the secretary’s interpretation squared with the purpose of the 
disregard instruction, rather than supplying his own.192 The secretary 
had provided that explanation along with its regulation in 1976.193 
The final consideration was the language of the statute, which 
Justice Breyer consulted to ensure that the agency had not acted 
outside the basic scope of its authority.194 What Justice Breyer looked 
for was a truly clear meaning or an “absolute literalness,” which he 
illustrated as follows: “A customs statute that imposes a tariff on 
‘clothing’ does not impose a tariff on automobiles, no matter how 
strong the policy arguments for treating the two kinds of goods 
alike.”195 The words of the Federal Impact Aid Act were not as easily 
understood as “clothing” or “automobiles.” Justice Breyer therefore 
sought outside assistance. He found that every mainstream and 
 
 186. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(1) (2000)). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 1541–42. 
 193. Id. at 1541. 
 194. Id. at 1543 (“[N]ormally neither the legislative history nor the reasonableness of the 
Secretary’s method would be determinative if the plain language of the statute unambiguously 
indicated that Congress sought to foreclose the Secretary’s interpretation.”). 
 195. Id. 
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technical dictionary—Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 
an economics dictionary, a mathematics dictionary, a science 
dictionary, and a medical dictionary—defined “per-pupil” the way 
that the secretary did.196 Furthermore, other education-related 
statutes also supported the interpretation.197 In addition, the “more 
general circumstance[s]” surrounding the statute confirmed the 
ambiguity of the phrase.198 Finally, Justice Breyer gathered 
“reassurance from the fact that no group of statisticians, nor any 
individual statistician, has told us directly . . . that the language before 
us cannot be read as we have read it.”199 He found this consideration 
“significant” because the words are “technical, and we are not 
statisticians.”200 The “upshot,” he said, is that “the language of the 
statute is broad enough to permit the Secretary’s reading.”201 For 
reasons that he had previously stated, he concluded that “the 
Secretary’s reading is a reasonable reading.”202 
Justice Breyer’s opinion drew criticism from all of his colleagues 
except Justice Ginsburg.203 Four Justices wrote separate statements, 
each reflecting a commitment to an alternative theory of statutory 
interpretation—or at least obedience to the Chevron doctrine as 
traditionally applied. Justice Stevens preferred intentionalism.204 He 
joined the majority opinion because he agreed that the text was 
“sufficiently ambiguous to justify the Court’s exegesis.”205 He said that 
the better approach, however, was to acknowledge that the 
“legislative history is pellucidly clear and the statutory text is difficult 
to fathom.”206 In his view, “this is a quintessential example of a case in 
which the statutory text was obviously enacted to adopt the rule that 
the Secretary administered both before and after the enactment of 
the rather confusing language” at issue.207 Thus, Congress had a clear 
 
 196. Id. at 1543–44. 
 197. Id. at 1545. 
 198. Id. at 1545–46. 
 199. Id. at 1546. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 1549–50 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 1550–51 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 
1551–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1559 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 204. Id. at 1549–50 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 205. Id. at 1550. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
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“intention on the precise question at issue.”208 Citing Church of the 
Holy Trinity v. United States,209 Justice Stevens stated that he would 
not upset this interpretation even if he thought that the literal reading 
were correct.210 
Justice Kennedy concurred, joined by Justice Alito, also 
expressing concern about the Court’s analysis.211 In his view, the 
Court was “correct to find that the plain language of the statute is 
ambiguous.”212 Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy noted that “[t]he 
opinion of the Court . . . inverts Chevron’s logical progression.”213 He 
worried that “[w]ere the inversion to become systemic, it would 
create the impression that agency policy concerns, rather than the 
traditional tools of statutory construction, are shaping the judicial 
interpretation of statutes.”214 Although he believed that the Court had 
not fulfilled its “obligation to set a good example,” he was willing this 
time to give Justice Breyer the benefit of the doubt “in matters of 
exposition.”215 
Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Thomas, and in part by Justice Souter.216 He took issue with 
the Court’s chosen interpretation as well as its overarching mode of 
analysis. First, he castigated Justice Breyer for treating the 
interpretive question in the case as a “scary math problem,” requiring 
a “hypothetical cadre of number-crunching amici to guide [the] 
way.”217 He also decried the “sheer applesauce” of Justice Breyer’s 
interpretation, which required a number of steps to get from local 
school districts to populations in those school districts to average per-
pupil expenditures.218 He read the words as they were written, 
refusing to consult dictionaries or statisticians.219 The contested phrase 
 
 208. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
n.9 (1984)). 
 209. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
 210. Zuni, 127 S. Ct. at 1550 (citing Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459). 
 211. Id. at 1550–51 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 212. Id. at 1551. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 1551 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 217. Id. at 1553 (citation omitted). 
 218. Id. at 1554. 
 219. Id. 
BRESSMAN IN FINAL2.DOC 12/8/2008  2:25:12 PM 
2009] CHEVRON’S MISTAKE 595 
was “local educational agencies with per-pupil expenditures.”220 
Carefully dismantling the Court’s interpretation, he argued that per-
pupil expenditure could not refer to the students themselves, but only 
to the local school districts.221 
Turning to the interpretive methodology, Justice Scalia rebuked 
Justice Breyer for applying intentionalism. Declaring that “today 
Church of the Holy Trinity arises, Phoenix-like, from the ashes,” he 
characterized Justice Breyer’s opinion as “nothing other than the 
elevation of judge-supposed legislative intent over clear statutory 
text.”222 Against this approach he offered a broad defense of 
textualism. Justice Scalia stated that “once one departs from ‘strict 
interpretation of the text’ . . . fidelity to the intent of Congress is a 
chancy thing” because “[t]he only thing we know for certain [is that] 
both Houses of Congress (and the President, if he signed the 
legislation) agreed upon . . . the text.”223 He dissected each piece of 
evidence on which Justice Breyer relied, showing that Congress could 
have just as easily intended to depart from the secretary’s 
interpretation.224 
These concurring and dissenting Justices, though reflecting 
differences among themselves, all thought that Justice Breyer failed 
to serve as a faithful agent of Congress. But they misperceived his 
approach. Justice Scalia assumed that it was intentionalism. But an 
intentionalist would have found, as Justice Stevens did, that Congress 
intended to select a specific policy—the methodology that the 
secretary had adopted—whereas Justice Breyer found only that 
Congress has intended to delegate interpretive authority to the 
secretary, who in turn had selected the policy. Justice Kennedy 
thought that Justice Breyer departed from legislative intent and 
undermined judicial authority by elevating agency policy over the 
traditional tools of statutory construction. If he did, it was in pursuit 
of a theory that reflected better assumptions about legislative 
 
 220. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000)). 
 221. Id. at 1554–55. 
 222. Id. at 1551. 
 223. Id. at 1556 (quoting id. at 1549 (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 224. Id. at 1556–59. Justice Souter felt similarly constrained by the strict meaning of the text 
and joined that part of Justice Scalia’s dissent, though not the broader defense of textualism. See 
id. at 1559 (Souter, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the Court that “Congress probably intended, or 
at least understood, that the Secretary would continue to follow the methodology devised prior 
to passage of the current statute in 1994” but finding the language “unambiguous and inapt to 
authorize that methodology”). 
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behavior. Indeed, the traditional tools prevented the other Justices 
from serving as faithful agents of Congress. Nowhere was this more 
evident than in the dissent. Justice Scalia focused on the words as 
written, on the assumption that interpreters can know no more about 
Congress than what it writes. Justice Breyer showed that interpreters 
might know much more about Congress if only they read the words of 
the statute in their political context rather than for their narrowest 
meaning. 
But the critics were right in one respect. Justice Breyer did not 
fully acknowledge the significance of his interpretive approach.225 He 
did not merely invert Chevron. He changed the unit of analysis from 
statutory meaning to interpretive delegation. Why did he? As 
Professors Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein have determined, Justice 
Breyer is already “the most deferential justice” on the sitting Court 
without the benefit of any novel approach.226 Furthermore, he had five 
votes for deference in this case under the traditional approach. Would 
a new approach allow Justice Breyer to teach others what his early 
experience with the legislative process had taught him?227 If so, his 
lesson is worth serious consideration. 
 
 225. The parallels have some limits: Justice Breyer has stated that he would not defer to 
agency interpretations on “question[s] of national importance,” including those that concern the 
scope of a statute, because Congress (or a reasonable member of Congress) would not intend to 
delegate these issues. BREYER, supra note 31, at 107. He has also stated that reasonable 
legislators would decide how to allocate interpretive authority to “help[] the statute work 
better . . . in both the functional and the democratic sense of the term,” rather than for more 
strategic reasons. Id. at 108. 
 226. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical 
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 826 (2006) (reporting that Justice Breyer is 
“the most deferential justice in practice,” whereas Justice Scalia is the least deferential); see also 
Daniel J. Gifford, The Emerging Outlines of a Revised Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent, 
Judicial Judgment, and Administrative Autonomy, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 785 (2007) 
(observing that Justice Breyer has “long favored . . . . mandatory deference in the more routine 
or interstitial interpretations, but not necessarily in matters at the core of the statutory design”). 
 227. See BREYER, supra note 31, at 106 (arguing that courts should examine considerations 
beyond statutory language to determine what a “reasonable member of Congress” would intend 
when allocating interpretive authority); Stephen Breyer, Lecture, Our Democratic Constitution, 
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 267 (2002) (arguing that judges should vary how much deference they 
show to an agency interpretation based on how much deference Congress wanted courts to 
show). In addition to teaching and writing in administrative law before becoming a judge, 
Justice Breyer served as special counsel of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary and as 
chief counsel of the committee. The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus. 
gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2008). 
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B. Gonzales v. Oregon 
Gonzales concerned an interpretation extending the reach of the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to the regulation of physician-
assisted suicide.228 Attorney General John Ashcroft issued this 
interpretation229 in the wake of an Oregon law that legalized 
physician-assisted suicide, “without consulting Oregon or apparently 
anyone outside his Department.”230 According to the interpretation, 
physician-assisted suicide is not a “legitimate medical purpose” for 
which physicians might dispense and prescribe controlled substances 
under the CSA and accompanying regulations.231 Physicians who 
dispense and prescribe controlled substances to assist suicide violate 
the CSA and jeopardize their federal registrations to prescribe 
controlled substances for other purposes, even if “state law authorizes 
or permits such conduct.”232 
The Court held that Congress has not delegated authority to the 
attorney general to issue the interpretation.233 Justice Kennedy wrote 
the opinion for the majority, joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.234 The Court acknowledged that the 
language of the CSA was ambiguous, which ordinarily supports 
agency delegation under Chevron.235 Nevertheless, it refused to 
presume that Congress implicitly would grant the executive branch 
such “broad and unusual” authority to criminalize an act that is legal 
under state law.236 Quoting earlier cases applying the “extraordinary” 
question principle, it noted that Congress is unlikely to “hide 
elephants in mouseholes.”237 The Court continued, explaining that 
 
 228. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 911 (2006). 
 229. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607, 56,608 
(Nov. 9, 2001), invalidated by Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 925–26. 
 230. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 913. 
 231. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. at 56,608 (quoting 
21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2001)); see also Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 913–14 (quoting Attorney 
General Ashcroft’s ruling in Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. 
Reg. at 56,608). 
 232. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 914 (quoting Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist 
Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. at 56,608). 
 233. Id. at 916–22. 
 234. Id. at 910. 
 235. Id. at 916 (“All would agree, we should think, that the statutory phrase ‘legitimate 
medical purpose’ is a generality, susceptible to more precise definition and open to varying 
constructions, and thus ambiguous in the relevant sense.”). 
 236. Id. at 921. 
 237. Id. (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)). 
BRESSMAN IN FINAL2.DOC 12/8/2008  2:25:12 PM 
598 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:549 
“[t]he importance of the issue of physician-assisted suicide, which has 
been the subject of an ‘earnest and profound debate’ across the 
country, makes the oblique form of claimed delegation all the more 
suspect.”238 
If the Court had said only this much, it would have failed to grasp 
the significance of this case. The problem was not simply one of 
elephants and mouseholes—for Congress can hide elephants in 
mouseholes when those elephants raise technical issues or impede 
legislative consensus. But this was not such a case. The question was 
extraordinary239 precisely because the ordinary reasons for 
interpretive delegation were not present. As the Court observed, the 
decision whether to permit physician-assisted suicide does not raise a 
technical issue but a moral, legal, and practical issue.240 Consequently, 
there was no reason to presume that Congress intended to delegate 
the issue of its meaning to the attorney general. In fact, Oregon had 
handled the issue through popular means of a voter ballot measure.241 
Furthermore, no evidence suggested that delegating physician-
assistant suicide to the attorney general was essential to the passage 
of the CSA. Indeed, Congress generally anticipated state laws 
regulating the medical profession, like Oregon’s physician-assisted 
suicide law.242 The Court stated that “[t]he structure and operation of 
the CSA presume and rely upon a functioning medical profession 
regulated under the States’ police powers.”243 If anything, Congress 
left the issue of regulating physician-assisted suicide to the states. 
The Court offered other considerations that reflected realistic 
assumptions about the legislative process. The Court noted that the 
attorney general lacks broad rulemaking power to enforce the 
relevant provisions of the statute.244 The Court did not connect the 
attorney general’s lack of authority with concerns about legislative 
monitoring, although no one outside the Department of Justice could 
observe the interpretation until it was a fait accompli.245 The Court did 
 
 238. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997)). 
 239. See id. at 918 (“[T]he Attorney General claims extraordinary authority.”). 
 240. Id. at 911. 
 241. Id. 
 242. See id. at 923 (“Oregon’s regime is an example of the state regulation of medical 
practice that the CSA presupposes.”). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 917. 
 245. See id. at 913 (noting that the attorney general did not consult the state or “anyone 
outside his Department”). 
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not even decide whether the attorney general could ever issue binding 
interpretations through its chosen procedure, an interpretive 
bulletin.246 Nevertheless, it acknowledged the importance of the 
procedural feature to the delegation analysis.247 Because Congress had 
not granted rulemaking power to the attorney general over medical 
practices such as physician-assisted suicide, it has not delegated 
interpretive authority to the attorney general over those practices.248 
Relatedly, the Court also stated that Attorney General Ashcroft 
exercised authority over an issue outside his area of expertise. The 
CSA provides the attorney general with authority to regulate “the 
registration and control of the manufacture, distribution, and 
dispensing of controlled substances.”249 Attorney General Ashcroft 
asserted a different sort of authority—the authority to determine 
whether physician-assisted suicide constitutes a legitimate medical 
practice.250 But the definition of medical practice is a technical issue. 
The Court stated that Congress tends to delegate in accordance with 
whether a particular agency possesses “historical familiarity and 
policymaking expertise.”251 The Court further recognized that 
Congress can expect no benefit from delegating the definition of 
medical practice to the attorney general, even if it might expect a 
benefit from delegating that issue to another federal agency.252 
Although Justice Kennedy purported to apply a fairly standard 
interpretive principle—the extraordinary question principle—he 
actually engaged a more accurate delegation analysis than that 
principle might suggest in other cases. He claimed that Congress was 
unlikely to delegate authority over physician-assisted suicide because 
of the normative significance of such a practice.253 Yet he 
demonstrated, more realistically, that Congress had little reason to 
delegate the issue to any agency and had little opportunity to monitor 
 
 246. See id. at 922 (deciding only that the attorney general may not “issue the Interpretative 
Rule as a statement with the force of law”). 
 247. Id. at 921. 
 248. See id. (“[T]he authority claimed by the Attorney General is both beyond his expertise 
and incongruous with the statutory purpose and design.”). 
 249. Id. at 917 (quoting 21 U.S.C.A. § 821 (Supp. V 2005)). 
 250. Id. at 921. 
 251. Id. (quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 
153 (1991)). 
 252. See id. (“The structure of the CSA . . . conveys unwillingness to cede medical judgments 
to an Executive official who lacks medical expertise.”). 
 253. See id. (“The importance of the issue of physician-assisted suicide . . . makes the 
oblique form of the claimed delegation all the more suspect.”). 
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how the attorney general would resolve the issue.254 He reasoned 
essentially that when neither the reasons nor the conditions for 
interpretive delegation are present, courts should conclude that 
Congress intended no such delegation.255 
Finding no interpretive delegation, the Court considered whether 
the attorney general’s interpretation nevertheless was “persuasive” 
under Skidmore.256 It concluded that the interpretation was not.257 The 
Court read the statute as if Congress had not meant to delegate 
authority over conduct like physician-assisted suicide at all, neither to 
the agency nor to the courts. Thus, the Court stated that the CSA 
“manifests no intent to regulate the practice of medicine generally” 
and, in fact, “presupposes” statutes like Oregon’s.258 Furthermore, 
what limited authority the CSA does delegate to regulate medical 
practices goes to the secretary of Health and Human Services, not the 
attorney general.259 Finally, the Court applied a traditional tool, a 
federalism canon, to resolve any residual statutory ambiguity: “The 
background principles of our federal system also belie the notion that 
Congress would use such an obscure grant of authority to regulate 
areas traditionally supervised by the States’ police power.”260 Given 
these reasons, it refused to approve the attorney general’s 
interpretation.261 
Justice Scalia dissented, offering a characteristically narrow 
reading of the language but this time to support the agency’s 
interpretation. Noting that the attorney general has undisputed 
authority to regulate prescriptions, Justice Scalia reasoned that the 
attorney general therefore has authority to determine that “the 
dispensation of a Schedule II substance for the purpose of assisting a 
suicide is not a ‘prescription’ within the meaning of [the statute]”262 
because the act of assisting suicide is not a “legitimate medical 
purpose” or otherwise in the public interest.263 The attorney general 
 
 254. See id. at 913 (noting that the attorney general issued the interpretative rule without 
consulting legislators). 
 255. See id. at 916 (finding that Auer and Chevron deference was unwarranted). 
 256. Id. at 922, 922–25 (applying Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). 
 257. Id. at 922. 
 258. Id. at 923. 
 259. Id. at 912, 924. 
 260. Id. at 925. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 931 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 263. Id. at 931, 935. 
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may further determine that any physician who writes illegitimate 
prescriptions “may ‘render his registration . . . inconsistent with the 
public interest’ and therefore subject to possible suspension or 
revocation under [the statute].”264 Justice Scalia found that this 
interpretation was “the most reasonable” reading of the CSA and 
would control regardless of whether the interpretive ruling was 
entitled to deference.265 
To summarize, in contrast to Justice Scalia’s textual analysis, 
Justice Kennedy’s analysis considered broader indications of 
legislative intent to delegate interpretive authority to the attorney 
general. In this way, his analysis enabled him to serve as a faithful 
agent of Congress. His approach also furthered other important 
normative values. By leaving authority to regulate physician-assisted 
suicide in the states, Justice Kennedy’s analysis advanced the 
principle of federalism. It allowed the states to continue to serve as 
laboratories for the experimentation with the regulation of physician-
assisted suicide. In addition, it ensured that agencies do not receive 
delegated interpretive authority unless they possess the requisite 
expertise and accountability for exercising it. 
*          *          * 
Zuni and Gonzales demonstrate how courts (or the Court) can 
focus on factors other than the clarity of statutory language to 
determine whether Congress likely delegated interpretive authority 
to the agency involved. Justice Breyer inverted Chevron and 
examined strategic delegation considerations before determining that 
the agency interpretation was reasonable and within the scope of the 
statute. Justice Kennedy purported to apply a standard interpretive 
principle but did so in appreciation of more realistic assumptions 
about the legislative process. Together, these Justices demonstrated 
that the focus on indications of interpretive delegation is not one 
directional: it can lead to a decision upholding an interpretive 
delegation or to a decision rejecting an interpretive delegation. 
These opinions also begin to reveal the normative significance of 
updating statutory interpretation to better capture the legislative 
indicia of interpretive delegation to agencies. Neither Justice 
 
 264. Id. at 931 (quoting Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 
56,607, 56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001)). 
 265. Id. 
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explained the reason for such a change or even fully acknowledged 
how much their opinions departed from the typical framework. 
Indeed, it might upset Justice Kennedy to know that his analysis was 
unconventional, given his objection to Justice Breyer’s analysis in 
Zuni. Nevertheless, each might have felt that their particular 
approach would best respect the will of Congress. At the same time, 
their approaches placed interpretive authority where other normative 
values suggested that it belonged. Agency expertise—and possibly 
political accountability—suggested that the agency should have the 
interpretive authority in Zuni. But the opposite was true in Gonzales. 
Moreover, federalism strongly suggested that the states should have 
the authority in Gonzales. 
IV.  OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES 
The evaluation of any interpretive theory lies in the balance of 
the goals that it accomplishes. Before turning to objections, it is worth 
highlighting the normative advantages of the theory that I have 
sketched. As I have shown, my delegation-respecting theory would 
enable courts to ascertain congressional will when interpreting 
regulatory statutes better than existing theories do. A delegation-
respecting theory would therefore better promote the principle of 
legislative supremacy in the regulatory context. In enacting regulatory 
statutes, Congress can delegate interpretive authority to agencies for 
the strategic benefit of the act of delegation itself. A delegation-
respecting theory would recognize this meta-aspect of legislative 
intent by offering courts appropriate proxies for detecting 
interpretive delegations to agencies. Not insignificantly, it also would 
place interpretive authority in the hands of those officials best able to 
discern and further substantive legislative purposes. Unlike courts, 
agencies have a continuous relationship with Congress and may have 
a better understanding of the general aims of legislation.266 Put simply, 
 
 266. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term—
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 71–72 (1994) (“Because of their place in 
governance, agencies are both knowledgeable about and responsive to presidential and 
congressional preferences.”); Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public 
Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why it Matters, 59 
ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 693 (2007) (noting that agencies interpret statutes in light of many 
nontextual considerations, including “the goals of public administration”); Herz, supra note 52, 
at 194 (observing that agencies may have participated in drafting, have an “institutional 
memory,” and have more familiarity with statutory purposes); Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency 
Statutory Interpretation, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Nov. 2002, art. 9, at 8–9, 
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agencies are likely to be the superior purposivists when it comes to 
resolving interpretive questions that Congress left open.267 
The theory proposed in this Article has other normative 
advantages. The reasons for which Congress delegates certain 
interpretive questions often make those questions especially 
appropriate for agency resolution, as Chevron recognizes.268 Complex 
questions typically benefit from agency expertise, and contentious 
legislative issues typically benefit from continuing political debate at 
the administrative level. Chevron notes that agencies are more 
accountable than courts—not directly but through the president.269 
Beyond these abstractions, both the White House and Congress 
maintain active interest in agency decisionmaking as it unfolds.270 The 
White House has a regulatory review apparatus and an informal 
network for that purpose. Congress can use administrative 
procedures to facilitate legislative monitoring. A theory that allows 
agencies to possess interpretive authority as often as Congress intends 
would promote both agency expertise and political accountability. A 
theory that makes proper procedures a condition of delegation also 
 
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art9 (noting that agencies consult legislative history and current 
political context, engaging in an interpretive process that is dynamic, because “[i]t is precisely 
their job as agents of past congresses and sitting politicians to synthesize the past with the 
present” (citing Ed Rubin, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, ISSUES 
IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Nov. 2002, art. 2, at 1, http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art2)); Trevor 
W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1240 
(2006) (“Because they have ‘programmatic responsibility for implementing statutory regimes,’ 
and because they interact frequently with Congress in the course of discharging that 
responsibility, agencies often have a very nuanced sense of congressional aims and statutory 
purpose.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge is Not the Primary 
Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative 
History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 321 (1990))); Edward L. Rubin, Modern Statutes, Loose 
Canons, and the Limits of Practical Reason: A Response to Farber and Ross, 45 VAND. L. REV. 
579, 586 (1992) (“[A] legislature and the administrative agencies within the same jurisdiction are 
linked by an incredibly dense network of relationships and shared activities.”). 
 267. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 150 
(2006) (“[A]gencies may be better than courts at discerning and applying congressional 
intent.”); cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 885, 931 (2003) (advocating an institutional approach to Chevron that would envision 
agencies as choosing purposivism and courts as deferring to that judgment). 
 268. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) 
(“[T]he Administrator’s interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly 
competing interests and is entitled to deference . . . .”). 
 269. See id. (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive 
is . . . .”). 
 270. See Bressman, supra note 161, at 1804–13 (discussing political involvement in the 
administrative process). 
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would reinforce rule-of-law values. As Mead suggests, procedural 
formality tends to ensure that agency decisionmaking is rational and 
fair.271 
At the same time, a theory that deprives agencies of interpretive 
authority absent sufficient indications of legislative intent to delegate 
would serve beneficial purposes. This negative side is essential to 
maintain a claim of legislative supremacy, allowing Congress to 
control when not to delegate. In addition, the negative aspect of the 
theory would preserve rule-of-law values by withholding interpretive 
authority when an agency fails to use proper procedures. Less 
intuitively, it would facilitate agency expertise and political 
accountability. Without sufficiently formal procedures, there is less 
assurance that agency decisionmaking reflects specialized knowledge 
rather than tunnel vision or political pressure. There is also less 
assurance that agency decisionmaking is transparent and therefore 
amenable to political oversight as well as judicial review. Signaling to 
agencies that they possess interpretive authority only when Congress 
intends would serve legislative supremacy and rule-of-law values, as 
well as promote agency expertise and political accountability. 
Yet this theory has serious downsides. If Zuni and Gonzales help 
to illustrate the theory in this Article, they also confirm that the 
theory is complicated—multifactored and context dependent, perhaps 
more so than a search for the meaning of statutory words. Justice 
Scalia was alarmed in Zuni to think that Justice Breyer was resorting 
to Holy Trinity intentionalism, elevating legislative history over 
statutory text. But the possibility that Justice Breyer was actually 
expanding Mead to include a variety of considerations would send 
him through the roof. Justice Scalia has castigated Mead for its 
uncertainty from the start, and his prediction about its potential to 
confuse lower courts has come to pass.272 In this Part, I address the 
institutional costs of the theory outlined in this Article. 
In addition, this theory squarely presents the difficulty of using 
statutory interpretation to constrain broad delegations. Since the 
demise of the nondelegation doctrine, courts have relied on statutory 
 
 271. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230, 231–33 (2001) (“Congress 
contemplates administrative action . . . when it provides for a relatively formal administrative 
procedure tending to foster [] fairness and deliberation . . . .”). 
 272. See id. at 241, 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The principle effect [of the majority’s 
decision] will be protracted confusion.”). See generally Bressman, supra note 26 (suggesting 
confusion over Mead was worse than Justice Scalia had predicted). 
BRESSMAN IN FINAL2.DOC 12/8/2008  2:25:12 PM 
2009] CHEVRON’S MISTAKE 605 
interpretation for this important purpose. In this way, one might say, 
Chevron and Mead function just as they should, providing courts with 
select opportunities to discipline broad delegations. I show that the 
general adoption of a delegation-respecting theory does not prevent 
courts from using statutory interpretation in a delegation-restricting 
fashion. At the same time, neither courts nor commentators can claim 
that such a practice is consistent with the aims of Congress, except in 
cases like Gonzales, when the evidence revealed that Congress likely 
did not intend the asserted delegation anyway. In light of this fact and 
for other reasons, I prefer an alternative method for disciplining 
broad delegations when the circumstances suggest a need. 
A. Institutional Costs 
The objection based on institutional costs is an enlarged version 
of the objection that Justice Scalia voiced when he dissented in Mead. 
He stated that the decision to inquire into legislative intent to 
delegate interpretive authority “makes an ‘avulsive change’ in judicial 
review of agency action, the consequences of which ‘will be 
enormous, and almost uniformly bad.’”273 As he saw matters, “[w]hat 
was previously a general presumption of authority in agencies to 
resolve ambiguity in the statutes they have been authorized to 
enforce has been changed to a presumption of no such authority, 
which must be overcome by affirmative legislative intent to the 
contrary.”274 He warned that the decision would confuse the lower 
courts. He stated, “We will be sorting out the consequences of the 
Mead doctrine, which has today replaced the Chevron doctrine, for 
years to come.”275 
Justice Scalia was correct about the effect of Mead on lower 
courts. Those courts have applied inconsistent analyses, vacillating 
between the factors that Mead provides and those that Barnhart 
provides.276 Indeed, courts in different circuits have split as to the 
same procedural format.277 Many have chosen instead to avoid 
resolving the procedural question altogether by upholding the agency 
 
 273. Bressman, supra note 26, at 1444 (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 239, 261 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). 
 274. Mead, 533 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 275. Id. (citations omitted). 
 276. See Bressman, supra note 26, at 1458–64 (“[T]he courts can be sorted into two groups: 
those that consider Mead-inspired factors and those that consider Barnhart-inspired factors.”). 
 277. See id. at 1459–61. 
BRESSMAN IN FINAL2.DOC 12/8/2008  2:25:12 PM 
606 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:549 
interpretation under Skidmore rather than Chevron.278 Although this 
avoidance is a practical solution to Mead’s complications, it may 
create difficulties should an agency seek to change its interpretation 
in the future. When a court upholds an agency interpretation under 
Skidmore, it effectively adopts that interpretation. Under Brand X, an 
agency may overrule a judicial interpretation only if the underlying 
statutory language is ambiguous.279 But the court may have avoided 
resolving this issue along with the procedural one, leaving the agency 
in a state of uncertainty. Finally, lower courts have used Mead as a 
basis for the extraordinary question principle, even though the two 
can reflect very different assumptions about legislative behavior.280 
That Congress demands procedures as a condition of delegation does 
not mean that it withholds issues for normative reasons, such as the 
national significance or jurisdictional nature of the issues. 
If Mead alone generates confusion among lower courts, a more 
elaborate version could produce disaster. Each factor would permit 
room for judgment and variation, potentially producing inconsistent 
analyses of the same interpretive issue. The theory would encourage 
courts to embrace Skidmore more often than before, reducing agency 
flexibility. Finally, the theory would create new opportunities and 
incentives for courts to forge questionable default rules for 
ascertaining legislative intent. 
Although these concerns are legitimate, they should not be 
overstated on the basis of lower courts’ experience with Mead. The 
Court has made Mead more complicated than it needs to be, and a 
theory tied to better assumptions about legislative behavior might 
help repair the problem. First, as discussed in Part II.B, a delegation-
respecting theory would focus on procedures that facilitate legislative 
monitoring, rather than only on abstract rule-of-law values such as 
fairness or deliberation. The message to courts would be that proper 
procedures are those that furnish constituents with information about 
agency action before such action is a fait accompli, so that those 
constituents may alert their legislators to intervene in the 
administrative process as necessary. Mead was correct under this 
 
 278. See id. at 1464–69 (describing how some courts “simply determine that lower-level 
Skidmore deference supports the agency’s interpretation”). 
 279. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 
(2005). 
 280. See Bressman, supra note 26, at 1469–74 (observing that courts are confusing explicit 
and implicit delegation questions under Mead). 
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analysis. U.S. Customs Service ruling letters are virtually impossible 
for Congress to monitor, through its constituents or otherwise.281 They 
are issued at a rate of 10,000 to 15,000 per year by forty-six different 
offices of the agency without any participatory process or reasoned 
explanation.282 Other procedures are better for monitoring purposes. 
Notice-and-comment rulemaking is the paradigm from a legislative 
monitoring perspective because it is the most accessible and 
informative, largely as a result of heavy judicial regulation.283 But 
other procedures might suffice, such as a public hearing preceded by 
notice and followed by an explanation of the decision.284 
Second, a delegation-respecting theory could address the shift to 
Skidmore by changing the application of that decision. Under the 
existing framework, courts can use Skidmore to uphold an agency 
interpretation without resolving the procedural question (and often 
without declaring whether the statutory text is clear or ambiguous). 
 
 281. See Bressman, supra note 161, at 1788–96 (drawing a connection between 
administrative procedures and legislative monitoring in Mead). 
 282. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233 (2001). 
 283. See Bressman, supra note 161, at 1792; see also McCubbins et al., Administrative 
Procedures, supra note 10, at 257–59 (discussing how procedural requirements impact 
accessibility). 
 284. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415, 419–20 (1971) 
(considering an interpretation under a statute requiring “a public hearing conducted by local 
officials for the purpose of informing the community about the proposed project and eliciting 
community views on the design and route,” followed by an administrative record containing an 
explanation of the decision). Interestingly, a harder case is a procedure that Mead approved for 
force-of-law purposes: formal adjudication. Formal adjudication does not permit legislative 
monitoring because neither constituents nor Congress may freely intervene. Yet it is possible to 
embrace Mead on this point. Congress, in designing the adjudicatory agencies, might have 
traded away the potential for legislative monitoring in favor of the sort of expertise that the 
adjudicatory model delivers—individualized consideration. Cf. Bawn, supra note 92, at 105 
(“Members of Congress choose not whether to use statutory provisions to control agencies but 
how much control to build into agency procedures at the possible expense of other goals like 
technical expertise, due process, and optimal use of information.” (citations omitted)). Or 
Congress may have intended that the adjudicatory agencies would, to the extent possible, 
resolve interpretive questions through notice-and-comment rulemaking in advance of formal 
adjudication. The major adjudicatory agencies like the National Labor Relations Board and the 
Federal Trade Commission possess notice-and-comment rulemaking authority. See M. 
Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1399 n.48 
(2004). Those agencies have not always used their rulemaking power. See id. at 1399 & n.48 
(“The NLRB and the FTC are known for their heavy reliance on adjudication . . . .”). 
Furthermore, Congress has seen fit to restrict their choice of procedures. But, as the Court has 
recognized, agencies cannot always foresee the need to issue interpretations in advance of 
adjudications. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he choice made between 
proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the 
informed discretion of the administrative agency.”). 
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Under the theory proposed in this Article, Skidmore would no longer 
provide an escape route. Courts would undertake the delegation 
analysis, which includes the procedural question, in all cases. Thus, 
courts could not avoid the procedural question simply by choosing 
Skidmore. Courts would still rely on Skidmore-style deference when 
an agency failed to use sufficiently formal procedures, but they would 
not thereby hamper agency flexibility. Rather, courts would possess 
interpretive authority unless the agency overrules the judicial 
interpretation by reissuing its own interpretation using sufficiently 
formal procedures. 
Finally, a delegation-respecting theory could minimize the 
misuse of Mead by exposing the assumptions about legislative 
behavior on which the decision implicitly relies but fails to fully 
implement. Once the procedural factor is understood as mattering to 
Congress for strategic reasons, the extraordinary question principle 
no longer seems categorically justifiable to discern legislative intent. 
That principle reflects a view of Congress as hanging on to certain 
issues because of their normative importance—their national 
significance or their jurisdictional nature.285 But Congress is unlikely 
to hold on to any issue unless doing so serves its own political 
interests. Thus, an extraordinary question principle is justifiable as a 
matter of legislative intent only to the extent that it overlaps with the 
factors that already form part of the new interpretive framework. 
Any blanket exemption for matters of great importance does not 
follow from Mead’s emphasis on delegation. To survive, the 
extraordinary question principle requires a separate democracy-
forcing justification, as I address in further detail in the next Section. 
If critics were to reject all other suggestions from this Article on 
institutional grounds, they should still accept the suggestion to 
embrace and reform Mead. Mead moves in the right direction by 
making delegation rather than meaning the threshold question. 
Although it does not go far enough for my purposes, it still serves a 
valuable gatekeeper function. By insisting on sufficiently formal 
procedures, Mead blocks certain interpretive delegations—those 
Congress does not intend. Likewise, it blocks interpretative 
delegations that transgress rule-of-law values. At the same time, a 
 
 285. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 51, at 845, 912–13 (arguing that the Court in Brown 
& Williamson addressed a question about the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction and suggesting 
that the Court address such questions in future cases at Chevron Step Zero). 
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focus on the legislative use of procedures refines the inquiry and 
reduces institutional costs. 
If Mead is still too much to take despite the clarifications herein, 
then one must be prepared to draw a broader lesson from this Article. 
Critics of Mead might seek a simpler test, but it should not be the 
existing framework. That framework is complicated in its own right, 
with courts using different interpretative tools and even using the 
same interpretive tools differently. Even if it is simple enough from 
an institutional perspective, it is deficient on other grounds. The 
search for meaning affords courts too much power to defeat 
interpretive delegations when Congress likely intended them and 
when they are likely to promote agency expertise and political 
accountability. It cannot supply the operative rule, whatever the 
institutional strengths. 
The appropriate rule under these circumstances is not one that 
acts as a judicial gatekeeper. Rather, it is a presumption of deference. 
By a presumption of deference, I mean a rule that upholds an agency 
interpretation so long as it is reasonable.286 (Admittedly, even this rule 
provides room for judicial judgment.) A presumption of deference 
strikes a better balance between institutional and normative goals, in 
light of legislative realties, than the existing framework. At one time, 
Chevron might have furnished a presumption of deference based on 
what the Court observed in that case about legislative intent to 
delegate. Well before Mead, the search for meaning got in the way. 
B. Nondelegation Issues 
Another potential problem with a delegation-respecting theory is 
how to use statutory interpretation to constrain broad delegations in 
light of legislative realities. Courts have long used statutory 
construction for this purpose, with a significant degree of scholarly 
approval. In this Section, I quickly catalogue the main ways courts 
have used statutory interpretation to constrain broad delegations. I 
 
 286. Professor Adrian Vermeule has argued that courts should look for stripped-down plain 
meaning and, finding none, accord deference to the agency interpretation because courts gain 
little benefit from probing other interpretive sources, including most textualist sources. ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION 183–229 (2006); see also Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 688–708 
(advocating an approach that casts “Chevron as a voting rule,” requiring consensus among the 
relevant decisionmakers as to the proper interpretation of a statute). My approach would not 
reintroduce the search for meaning even in limited form because it still asks a question that risks 
judicial misuse. 
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briefly demonstrate that such an approach can no longer be 
associated, even nominally, with congressional will. Nevertheless, I 
show that a delegation-respecting theory does not preclude courts or 
commentators from pursuing it. I prefer an alternative approach for 
addressing the concerns about broad delegations. 
1. The Nondelegation Tools.  Ever since the demise of the 
nondelegation doctrine in 1935, courts have relied on statutory 
interpretation to address their persistent worries about broad 
delegations.287 Broad delegations enable legislators to avoid 
responsibility for making hard policy choices while claiming credit for 
statutory responses.288 They place policymaking in the hands of 
unelected bureaucrats. They supply few standards to prevent agencies 
from rendering arbitrary decisions.289 And they erode the structural 
safeguards for other values, including federalism and criminal 
lenity.290 Although the Court has been unwilling to enforce 
constitutional restrictions on broad delegations, it has used statutory 
interpretation to respond to these underlying concerns.291 
It is possible to characterize many interpretive principles—and 
even an interpretive theory—as ways to restrict broad delegations. 
For example, Professor John Manning has argued that textualism can 
function as a nondelegation doctrine.292 By compelling courts to 
adhere to the text, textualism effectively prevents Congress from 
 
 287. See Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium, supra note 29, at 1415–18 
(collecting tools and principles that enable courts to address concerns about broad delegations 
as a matter of statutory construction rather than constitutional law); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 338 (2000) (noting the judicial turn to 
nondelegation canons, which require a clear statement from Congress on policy issues). 
 288. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 72, at 10. 
 289. See id. at 14–15 (noting that broad delegation permits agencies to regulate in ways that 
restrict individual liberty without a sufficiently public purpose); Bressman, Schechter Poultry at 
the Millennium, supra note 29, at 1416 (noting that a lack of statutory standards permits 
arbitrariness). 
 290. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 
1385 (2001) (stating that a presumption against preemption forces Congress to provide states 
with notice of when their interests are at stake, enabling them to fight for protection in the 
legislative process). But see Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. 
CT. REV. 175, 182–87 (arguing that any clear rule—including the opposite presumption in favor 
of preemption—would provide states with notice, and arguing more generally that a 
presumption against preemption cannot be justified on any of the asserted grounds). 
 291. See Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium, supra note 29, at 1415–18 
(collecting interpretive principles for narrowing broad delegations); Sunstein, supra note 287, at 
338 (identifying certain canons of construction as means for narrowing broad delegations). 
 292. See, e.g., Manning, Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 5, at 702–25. 
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delegating interpretive authority to individual legislators through 
legislative history.293 Legislators have incentives to carefully consider 
the deals they strike because they cannot effectively undo those deals 
through legislative history. In addition, selected legislators are not 
making law for the whole. The people are entitled to policy made by a 
majority of their elected representatives, not a few. 
Textualism can operate as a nondelegation doctrine in another 
sense. As Justice Scalia has noted, textualism is useful for defeating 
the sort of ambiguity that affords agencies room to expand their 
regulatory authority.294 Courts can construe language as clear and as 
foreclosing the asserted delegation. In this way, courts can prevent 
statutes from going too far. 
So-called “nondelegation canons” and clear statement rules 
serve a similar purpose, although they do not always deny textual 
ambiguity.295 Rather, these principles refuse to take that ambiguity as 
authorizing an expansive agency interpretation. Thus, the Court has 
held that Congress would not delegate interpretive authority to 
agencies over extraordinary questions without expressly so stating. In 
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph 
Co.,296 the Court refused to permit the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) to read the words “modify any requirement”297 as 
allowing the agency to essentially eliminate a central requirement for 
 
 293. See id. at 690–95 (arguing that the ultimate concern about legislative history is 
legislative self-dealing); John F. Manning, Putting Legislative History to a Vote: A Response to 
Professor Siegel, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1529 (2000) (“If the judiciary accepts certain types of 
legislative history (committee reports and sponsors’ statements) as ‘authoritative’ evidence of 
legislative intent in cases of ambiguity, then the particular legislators who write that history (the 
committees and sponsors) effectively settle statutory meaning for Congress as a whole.”). 
 294. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 511, 521. 
 295. See Elhauge, supra note 51, at 2051–55 (describing many canons as useful for eliciting 
congressional responses); Sunstein, supra note 287, at 338 (characterizing certain exceptions to 
Chevron as nondelegation canons that require a clear statement from Congress on policy 
issues); see also Williams N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation 
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 388–89 (1991) (arguing that the rule of lenity helps to elicit 
congressional responses); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can 
Include the Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18–37 (2007) (arguing that a presumption 
against preemption would improve the legislative process in general because state laws often 
bring critical issues to national attention that Congress might otherwise be inclined to avoid); 
Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 346–47 
(noting the argument that the rule of lenity serves a nondelegation function). 
 296. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
 297. Id. at 224 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (2000)). 
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all long-distance carriers except the dominant one.298 Likewise, in 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,299 the Court refused to 
permit the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to interpret the 
words “drug” and “delivery device” as allowing the agency to 
regulate the manufacture and sale of cigarettes and other tobacco 
products.300 As Justice Scalia remarked, Congress does not “hide 
elephants in mouseholes.”301 In other words, Congress does not 
delegate interpretive authority to agencies over issues of such 
economic or social significance through mere ambiguity. 
The Court has sought to protect federalism interests through an 
analogous strategy. Federal statutes often conflict with state laws, yet 
they contain an ambiguous preemption provision or no preemption 
provision at all.302 Agencies then issue interpretations concerning the 
preemptive effect of their statutes and regulations. In many of these 
cases, the Court has invoked a presumption against preemption.303 It 
has demanded a clear statement from Congress before allowing an 
agency interpretation to preempt state law.304 
The Court has also refused to read ambiguities as granting 
agencies the authority to raise constitutional questions. In Solid Waste 
 
 298. See id. at 231 (“It is highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determination of 
whether an industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion—
and even more unlikely that it would achieve that through such a subtle device as permission to 
‘modify’ rate-filing requirements.”). 
 299. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 300. See id. at 160 (“[W]e are confident that Congress could not have intended to delegate a 
decision of such economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”). 
 301. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). Some scholars have agreed 
that certain questions are too significant for Congress to delegate through ambiguity. See, e.g., 
Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2173–75 (2004) (arguing that agency interpretations of the scope of 
their own regulatory power should be given Skidmore, rather than Chevron, deference). 
 302. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the 
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 243 (2007) (“The regulatory preemption 
debate centers on the extent to which [agency interpretations] go beyond simply reciting the 
preemptive effect of the governing statute or regulation promulgated within the agency’s 
delegated authority, and instead attempt to discern the proper scope of preemption with little or 
no direction from Congress.”). 
 303. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[W]e ‘start with the 
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the 
Federal Act unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” (quoting Hillsborough 
County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985))); Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron 
and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 738–40 (2004) (describing cases). 
 304. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485. 
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Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,305 
the Court applied the “avoidance of questions” canon to invalidate an 
agency interpretation that raised a question under the Commerce 
Clause.306 In this way, the avoidance canon prevents agencies from 
taking statutes into constitutional gray zones. 
The Court has held that Congress does not intend for agencies to 
interpret ambiguities in criminal sanctions provisions. Rather, the 
Court has invoked the rule of lenity to interpret those provisions 
when necessary to protect potential criminal violators.307 Although the 
rule of lenity is not a constitutional requirement, it is a well-
established norm for interpreting ambiguities in federal criminal 
statutes.308 It affords criminal defendants notice of prohibited conduct, 
protection against overzealous prosecution, and freedom from 
unauthorized liberty deprivation.309 
2. The Normative Difficulty.  The theory proposed in this Article 
does not prevent courts from vindicating nondelegation or other 
values through statutory interpretation. But courts pursuing any of 
these strategies must stick to their normative justifications. Many of 
these tools have always had at least some nominal association with 
the legislative design of statutes. Thus, textualism presumes that 
Congress cuts deals, and legislative history should not frustrate them. 
The nondelegation canons presume that Congress intends to withhold 
certain issues from agency control because of the normative values 
that they implicate—whether matters of constitutional structure or 
individual liberty.310 The difficulty is that courts and commentators 
can no longer regard the nondelegation tools in the same light. 
 
 305. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 
(2001). 
 306. Id. at 172–73. For discussion and examples of the doctrine of avoidance, see Adrian 
Vermeule, Savings Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1948–49 (1997). 
 307. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 985 
(2005) (suggesting that a court might employ the rule of lenity to declare a statute unambiguous, 
thereby precluding deference to the agency). 
 308. See Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist Court, 
74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1067 (2006) (characterizing the rule of lenity as a “common-law 
tradition”); Hickman, supra note 131, at 935 (“Lenity’s status as an absolute constitutional 
requirement rather than a quasi-constitutional canon of construction is questionable.”); Kahan, 
supra note 295, at 346–47 (describing the rule of lenity as a “quasi-constitutional” doctrine). 
 309. See Kahan, supra note 295, at 346–47 (making these observations about the rule of 
lenity). 
 310. Many scholars do not rely on the association with legislative intent in defending the 
nondelegation canons. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 27, at 2052–53 (noting the importance of 
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To see this point, take two examples: extraordinary questions 
and preemption questions. Congress can delegate interpretive power 
to agencies over extraordinary questions because of the complexity of 
the underlying regulatory issues.311 The FCC must ensure that the 
dominant carrier does not possess monopoly power while allowing 
new entrants to flourish, calibrating the statute’s requirements 
accordingly.312 The FDA must consider the health effects of particular 
products, evaluating their safety and efficacy by relying on scientific 
studies and medical judgments. Furthermore, Congress authorized 
the agencies to use notice-and-comment rulemaking for regulating in 
their respective domains.313 Congress may not have anticipated the 
precise interpretations, concerning the tariff-filing requirement and 
tobacco products. But Congress frequently thinks only in general 
terms. Courts cannot effectively undermine the delegation by later 
attributing the extraordinary nature of the question to Congress. In 
fact, the evidence that Congress did not intend the FDA to regulate 
tobacco did not have to do with the enacting Congress. Rather, it 
concerned subsequent Congresses and subsequent legislation.314 
Similarly, Congress can delegate preemption questions when 
they are complex or technical. Banking law is an illustration. The 
National Bank Act grants national banks the power to engage in 
mortgage lending, subject to regulation by the Office of the 
 
“constitutional guideposts,” including substantive and procedural fairness, when judges 
interpret criminal statutes); Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, 
Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1848–
49 (2005) (defending a presumption against preemption as “a normative rule of construction, 
which means it cannot be grounded in some descriptive judgment about Congress’s intent in 
enacting the relevant statute”). 
 311. Congress may not even be able to distinguish between extraordinary and routine 
questions. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law 
Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2606 (2006) (“[N]o simple line separates minor or interstitial from major 
questions.”); id. at 2604 (noting that the line between jurisdictional questions and others is “far 
from clear”). 
 312. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 220–21 (1994) (cataloguing the 
development of FCC regulations restricting the monopoly power of dominant carriers). 
 313. See 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (2006) (authorizing the FDA specifically to conduct notice-and-
comment rulemaking); MCI Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 220–37 (acknowledging the 
authority of the FCC to conduct notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
 314. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120, 137–38, 144–61 (2000) 
(consulting later-enacted statutes to confirm interpretation of a prior statute). Such evidence is 
arguably relevant to the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation. See Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 779–80 (2007); Elhauge, 
supra note 51, at 2148 (arguing that agency interpretations are not reasonable if they conflict 
with current enactable congressional preferences). 
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Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).315 It also grants national banks 
“all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the 
business of banking.”316 The act further grants “visitorial powers” (the 
power to “inspect, examine, supervise, and regulate the affairs of an 
entity and to enforce compliance with applicable laws”317) over 
national banks to the OCC and provides that “[n]o national bank 
shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by 
Federal law.”318 Thus, states are effectively preempted from exercising 
visitorial powers over national banks under their own laws. The OCC 
issued a rule interpreting this provision as preempting the states from 
exercising visitorial powers over operating subsidiaries of national 
banks.319 National banks have authority to conduct business through 
operating subsidiaries as part of their “incidental powers,” and the 
rule defined operating subsidiaries as separately incorporated 
divisions or departments of the parent bank.320 As a result of the rule, 
Michigan could not permit its officials to exercise examination and 
enforcement authority over mortgage lending by operating 
subsidiaries of a national bank.321 
In Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.322 the Court confronted the 
question whether the OCC rule was entitled to Chevron deference.323 
The Court refused to decide, finding the level of deference 
“academic” because the interpretation matched the Court’s own 
interpretation of the statute.324 The theory offered in this Article 
might reach the same result but for a different reason—one more in 
line with legislative intent. The interaction between federal and state 
banking systems is so highly complex as to indicate that Congress 
likely delegated it to the agency. As the Court acknowledged, the 
OCC had to determine whether “duplicative state examination, 
supervision, and regulation” that undoubtedly would burden 
mortgage lending by national banks would similarly burden that 
 
 315. 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2006). 
 316. Id. § 24. 
 317. Ernest T. Patrikis & Glen R. Cuccinello, Supreme Court Extends Federal Preemption to 
National Bank Operating Subsidiaries, 124 BANKING L.J. 512, 515 (2007). 
 318. 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006). 
 319. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2006). 
 320. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(1) (2006); 31 Fed. Reg. 11,459, 11,459–60 (Aug. 31, 1966). 
 321. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572–73 (2007). 
 322. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007). 
 323. See id. at 1572. 
 324. See id. 
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lending “when engaged in by an operating subsidiary.”325 The agency’s 
determination on these matters should have controlled because 
Congress so intended and because it reflected a reasonable 
reconciliation of the competing concerns underlying the statute. 
Congress also has reasons to delegate preemption questions 
when necessary to obtain consensus. The 2007 fuel economy 
legislation offers an illustration. That legislation set an average fuel 
economy standard of thirty-five miles per gallon for new automobiles 
by 2020.326 During negotiations, Representative John Dingell 
(D-Mich.) and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) waged a 
heated battle over many issues, including whether to preempt 
California and other states from setting their own more stringent 
standards.327 Representative Dingell asked for specific language that 
would have preempted state standards, and Speaker Pelosi resisted.328 
The legislators agreed to leave the issue ambiguous.329 The fight 
recommenced promptly at the administrative level.330 
The point of these examples is not to show that the 
nondelegation canons are unjustified. Rather, the point is to show 
that the nondelegation canons must be justified on normative 
grounds. The Court, for its part, has not maintained a steadfast 
commitment to the nondelegation canons in the face of evidence that 
Congress may have intended the delegation.331 Thus, the Court has 
shown ambivalence about which values ought to prevail. A 
delegation-respecting theory does not prevent more rigorous defense 
 
 325. Id. at 1570. 
 326. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 102(a)(2), 
121 Stat. 1492, 1499. 
 327. See John M. Broder & Micheline Maynard, Deal in Congress on Plan to Raise Fuel 
Efficiency, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2007, at A1. 
 328. See id. 
 329. See id. 
 330. See John M. Broder & Felicity Barringer, E.P.A. Says 17 States Can’t Set Greenhouse 
Gas Rules for Cars, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, at A1 (noting that, on the heels of the new fuel 
economy legislation, the EPA blocked California and other states from imposing their own 
standards and that the states plan to file a federal lawsuit to reverse that decision). 
 331. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190–91 (1991) (refusing to invalidate an agency 
interpretation—the so-called abortion “gag rule”—even though it raised a possible First 
Amendment question); Mendelson, supra note 303, at 740 (noting inconsistency in the 
preemption context); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232 (2000) (“Most 
commentators who write about preemption agree on at least one thing: Modern preemption 
jurisprudence is a muddle.”); Sharkey, supra note 302, at 243 (stating that Congress has 
provided “little or no direction” in the preemption debate). 
BRESSMAN IN FINAL2.DOC 12/8/2008  2:25:12 PM 
2009] CHEVRON’S MISTAKE 617 
of nondelegation tools. But it underscores the necessity of that 
defense. 
3. The Administrative Law Alternative.  My preference is not to 
embrace the nondelegation canons or textualism to constrain broad 
delegations, even though I am sympathetic to the problem that they 
seek to address. I would address this problem another, better way. 
Although this is not the place to fully elaborate my suggestion, the 
basic idea is that courts should reframe nondelegation worries in 
terms of administrative behavior rather than legislative behavior. 
Broad delegations give agencies considerable latitude in answering 
interpretive questions. And agencies can fall short of proper 
performance. Specifically, agencies can fail to adequately consider all 
the relevant factors or interests involved, particularly if a particular 
result is important to the agency’s priorities or to the administration’s 
priorities.332 Under these circumstances, a court could remand the 
interpretation to the agency for further consideration under the 
arbitrary and capricious test of administrative law.333 
The administrative law strategy would send agencies a strong 
message about a court’s own view of the question involved but, at the 
same time, would have certain modesty. First, it would not pit the 
court against Congress when circumstances suggest that Congress is 
likely to have intended the interpretive delegation.334 For a court to 
impose its own views or call for a clear statement when Congress 
intended the agency to balance the competing interests does not 
promote good interbranch relations. 
Second, an administrative law approach would not enable courts 
to assume excessive interpretive control, as the traditional 
nondelegation strategies can do. Given the complexities of the 
 
 332. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 
(1983) (requiring the agency to consider the relevant factors and remanding a rule that failed to 
do so). 
 333. See Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium, supra note 29, at 1415–31 (arguing 
that courts might withhold deference from agency interpretations that fail to articulate limiting 
standards); see also Stack, supra note 159, at 958 (arguing that the reasoned decisionmaking 
requirement may serve nondelegation norms). 
 334. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 51, at 915 (arguing that the avoidance of questions 
canon expands the Court’s authority beyond its constitutional limits and quoting Judge Posner, 
who says that the canon is therefore likely to “sharpen the tensions between the legislative and 
judicial branches” (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND 
REFORM 285 (1985))); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 90–97 
(advocating abandoning the avoidance of questions canon). 
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legislative process, Congress rarely provides express agency 
authorization in response to a clear statement rule or restrictive 
judicial interpretation.335 Rather, Congress usually leaves in place the 
court’s narrowing construction, whether or not that decision reflects 
legislative preferences.336 Consequently, courts alone can determine 
that a statute does not reach a particular subject, preempt state law, 
raise a constitutional question, or impose a harsh criminal sanction. 
Furthermore, courts can do so more often than they should because 
statutory interpretation provides a relatively low-cost method of 
protecting normative values. Compared to constitutional 
decisionmaking, statutory interpretation often attracts less public 
attention and represents less legal change. The Court can use 
statutory interpretation to protect federalism values in a decision like 
Gonzales without drawing the reaction that it would for overruling 
the leading Commerce Clause or Tenth Amendment decisions. 
Lower courts can use statutory interpretation to protect normative 
values without incurring the wrath of the Court for usurping the 
power to alter constitutional law.337 
Finally and related, an administrative law approach would afford 
agencies an opportunity to reweigh interpretive questions. Agencies 
are still in the best position to resolve interpretive questions, even if 
courts can help clarify the interests at stake.338 Agencies have a better 
understanding of the regulatory scheme and its complexities. 
Furthermore, agencies have a connection to both political branches. 
Congress as well as the White House can participate in the 
formulation of policy at the administrative level.339 By remanding an 
issue to the agency, courts could signal Congress to take note. This 
strategy may not force Congress to take responsibility for policy 
choices when drafting legislation.340 But it could prompt Congress to 
 
 335. See Note, New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical Study 
of Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1604, 
1605 (2007) (examining congressional responses to Supreme Court preemption decisions during 
the 1993 through 2003 Terms and concluding that “Congress almost never responds to the 
Court’s preemption decisions, so mistaken interpretations for or against preemption are 
unlikely to be corrected”). 
 336. See id. 
 337. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American 
Trucking Ass’ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452, 469–81 (2002) (describing the Court’s angry 
response to the efforts of a D.C. Circuit judge to alter the nondelegation doctrine). 
 338. See supra text accompanying notes 268–69. 
 339. See supra text accompanying notes 270–71. 
 340. See supra text accompanying note 72. 
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play a more active role in the selection of such choices by the agency, 
which is an advantage from a democratic perspective. 
Administrative law is not a perfect substitute for statutory 
interpretation precisely because it does not allow courts to lock in a 
particular interpretation on normative grounds. An agency has a 
second shot, albeit one that occurs in the shadow of a judicial remand 
and with the increased scrutiny of interested parties. To my mind, 
that is a desirable result. The formulation of regulatory policy often 
involves reconciling conflicting interests, suggesting that judges 
should not simply elevate one value at the expense of other important 
considerations. The best way to discipline broad delegations, in light 
of all the factors at stake, is for courts to ensure that agencies 
adequately consider those factors and defend their resulting policy 
choices. 
*          *          * 
In sum, the objections to the theory I propose in this Article are 
not without responses. If courts are to respect agency delegation, they 
must be willing to reorient their approach. They would encounter 
tradeoffs with other goals. This Article is not meant to discount those 
other goals but to call for balance among them. The existing 
interpretive framework does a poor job of enabling courts to respect 
agency delegation. A theory that aims to improve on that front and 
secure related values would carry institutional costs, perhaps not 
much more so than the existing framework though certainly more so 
than a default deference rule. It would also present starkly the degree 
to which Congress likely delegates interpretive authority to agencies 
despite judicial and scholarly preferences for nondelegation. Courts 
and commentators must examine how best to vindicate nondelegation 
values once they fully appreciate the distance between those values 
and legislative realities. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that existing administrative law inadequately 
positions courts to recognize the existence of agency delegation 
because it invites courts to apply the traditional theories of statutory 
interpretation. For all their differences, the traditional theories 
operate in a similar fashion, directing courts to construe statutory text 
as if Congress was aiming for a relatively specific meaning. This basic 
presumption about legislative behavior cannot be squared with what 
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many political scientists and legal scholars have been saying for some 
time about how Congress designs regulatory statutes. And it is this 
basic presumption that Chevron and Mead fail to sufficiently dislodge. 
In this Article, I imagine a theory of statutory interpretation that 
focuses courts on the factors that matter to Congress when delegating 
interpretive authority to agencies. For example, Congress is likely to 
delegate when an issue is complex, both to conserve legislative time 
and harness agency expertise. It is likely to delegate when an issue is 
contentious and an obstacle to a law’s enactment. Whatever the 
reason for delegating, Congress is likely to seek means for ensuring 
that agency interpretations roughly track legislative preferences. 
Congress can use administrative procedures to place constituents in 
the administrative process, where those constituents can demand 
legislative intervention if agency interpretations stray too far. It can 
also observe agency interpretations directly if an agency is involved in 
the legislative drafting process or has a prior longstanding 
interpretation. To create a better theory, courts would focus on these 
factors rather than the relative clarity of language as a proxy for 
interpretive delegation. Even one reason for delegating and one 
condition on the delegation might suffice to build a case for 
interpretive delegation. But the stronger the case, the less courts 
should be inclined to read the statutory text as clear and as 
foreclosing the delegation. 
Although my theory departs from the framework that courts 
generally apply, I have shown that it is not without precedent. 
Members of the Court can be understood to have pursued a strikingly 
similar approach. I offer these cases, not as examples of a burgeoning 
trend in statutory interpretation, but, more modestly, to show how 
the Court can incorporate more realistic assumptions of legislative 
behavior into statutory interpretation if it chooses. 
The theory that this Article envisions has many advantages. 
Taking account of legislative realities is worthwhile in its own right 
and to promote agency expertise and political accountability, as well 
as rule-of-law values. Agencies should possess interpretive authority 
as often as Congress delegates such authority—and no more often 
than that—to ensure that regulatory policy is technically 
sophisticated, publicly responsive, and consistently applied. 
I have acknowledged that a delegation-respecting theory raises 
an institutional objection. Lower courts might struggle to apply it, as 
they have Mead. I have argued against condemning the new theory on 
the basis of lower courts’ experience with Mead. It promises to 
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simplify Mead while integrating more appropriate assumptions about 
legislative behavior. Even if a delegation-respecting theory is 
intolerably complicated, I have contended that Chevron still fails to 
provide the proper rule. That decision has never been particularly 
easy for courts to apply. Moreover, I have argued that it cannot 
supply the relevant test for normative reasons. The only 
institutionally simple and normatively justifiable proposal is a true 
presumption of judicial deference, directing reviewing courts to 
uphold agency interpretations more so than Chevron’s presumption 
has ever done. 
Finally, I have noted that a delegation-respecting theory presents 
a challenge for the use of statutory interpretation to constrain broad 
delegations. As a general matter, my theory does not preclude courts 
from pursuing this strategy. Yet it does suggest that courts can no 
longer base their interpretive practices on how Congress designs 
statutes. Furthermore, there is a better way to address the underlying 
concerns about broad delegations. Courts could use administrative 
law to police how agencies exercise their interpretive authority rather 
than using statutory interpretation to narrow delegations that 
Congress likely intended to make. I believe that this approach would 
offer courts a better role to play. Courts could make known their 
views on issues that implicate normative values, but agencies would 
reconcile the competing interests through application of their 
specialized expertise and in consultation with the political branches. 
When courts think about the proper method for interpreting 
regulatory statutes, they recognize the need to account for the 
possibility of agency delegation. But existing law confines them to 
interpretive practices ill suited to this context. As a result, courts 
construct a meaning for text in regulatory statutes more often than 
they should. A more deferential approach, with more restrained 
opportunities for judicial intervention, would produce better 
regulatory policy. It would allow agencies the leeway to set regulatory 
policy under judicial supervision rather than subject to judicial 
domination. 
